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Abstract 
This dissertation contributes to the historiography on the central-local government relationship in the 
1980s by looking at the conflict between Sheffield City Council and the Thatcher governments from 
1979-85. This dissertation also adds to the work of George Jones and John Stewart on the role of local 
government in a centralised state. Through their research they have advocated adopting a more 
localist approach to the central-local government relationship so that local government can be 
effective. Much work has been done on the central-local government relationship during the Thatcher 
era but detailed contemporary accounts of what happened in Sheffield are few and far between. 
Building on research recently conducted by both David Price and Daisy Payling this Council-centric 
investigation extensively uses archival material to analyse the day-to-day decision-making process of 
Sheffield City Council in its fight against certain aspects of Thatcherism. Through two separate but 
related chapters the Council's fight against the implementation of the Housing Act 1980 and local 
government finance reform will be discussed. It will be argued that the Council had only two weapons 
at their disposal in these two conflicts with Thatcher: obstruction and 'propaganda'. The Council could 
obstruct the implementation of legislation passed in Parliament while producing anti-Thatcher 
'propaganda' to rally both local and national support for their cause. This approach would see the 
Council and its leader, David Blunkett, elevated to a position of national prominence as one of the 
leading figures in the local authority opposition. However, this was merely 'theatrics'. The theatrics of 
the Council gave the impression that they were an equal opponent in the central-local government 
conflict and were in a position to mount a significant challenge to Thatcher's agenda. Although the 
Council were fairly successful in hindering the implementation of Thatcher's agenda in Sheffield in 
the short-term, when they were presented with the possibility of venturing into illegality they buckled 
under central government pressure.   
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Introduction 
 
On the 28th April 1983 Margaret Thatcher came to Sheffield to deliver a speech as part of the annual 
Cutler's Feast. She was greeted by 2,000 demonstrators, some of whom threw flour and eggs at her as 
she arrived. The chaos that ensued outside Cutler's Hall caused a police horse 'to lose its footing and 
smash into the back window of her official car.'1 The Iron Lady was clearly an unpopular figure in the 
Steel City. In December 1984 Oliver Letwin, a member of Thatcher's Policy Unit, spoke to the Prime 
Minister regarding his concerns surrounding Sheffield City Council's potential action in the midst of 
the rate-capping revolt. He stated that 'the machinery employed by the Marxists in Sheffield is 
extremely impressive' and that the Council 'has been turned into a political juggernaut with a 
momentum of its own.'2 These are just two examples of the well-known animosity that was present 
between Margaret Thatcher and her government on one side and the people of Sheffield with their 
Labour-controlled Council on the other. 
The 1980s was a divisive period both politically and in British society more generally. It saw the 
break away from the post-war consensus and the move towards what is now regarded as the post-
Thatcherite consensus.  Pre-Thatcherite Britain was increasingly seen as the "sick man of Europe" as 
it was crippled by industrial action and poor economic performance in the late 1960s and 1970s. For 
Thatcher the country required a drastic cure to its worsening ailments. The unprecedented change that 
she oversaw as Prime Minister was divisive at the time and her legacy still divides many communities 
across the country to this day. This period also saw some of the most bitter in-fighting take place 
within the Labour Party. Labour became increasingly unelectable as the Left of the Party and the more 
'moderate' wing publicly traded blows against one another. Local government took on a significant 
role for the Labour Party. Struggling to galvanise mass support at the national level, Labour-
controlled local authorities became strongholds for the Labour Party. Councils like Sheffield, with 
                                                     
1
 M. Lynch,  'Angry Mob Greeted Former PM in Sheffield', The Star, 9th April 2013 [Online], Available at: 
http://www.thestar.co.uk/news/angry-mob-greeted-former-pm-in-sheffield-1-5564790 [Accessed: 21/08/2017]. 
2
 Record of conversation between Oliver Letwin and Margaret Thatcher, 20th December 1984, pp. 1-2, Available 
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strong local mandates, were key to the Labour Party's fight against Thatcherism and to the very 
survival of the Party itself during this tumultuous time.3 
The relationship between Sheffield City Council and central government between 1979 and 1985 was 
one of unrelenting hostility. There was without a doubt an ongoing conflict between Thatcher and the 
Council throughout these years. David Blunkett, Leader of the Council from 1980 to 1987, gained 
national prominence because of this conflict. The approach that he and the Labour Group formulated 
to try and challenge central government policy established Sheffield nationally as a leading local 
authority in the anti-Thatcher movement.  
This dissertation investigates this central-local government conflict through the extensive use of 
archival material available at the Sheffield Archives and Central Studies Library. By using this newly 
available archival material to explore the day-to-day decision making of Sheffield City Council and 
its various committees and sub-committees it will be shown how the Council fought against certain 
aspects of Thatcher's agenda. What this investigation will highlight is that centralism is dominant in 
the central-local government relationship. Due to the lack of political power that local government has 
in the central-local government relationship it will be argued that Sheffield City Council's only tactics 
in its fight against Thatcherism were obstruction and 'propaganda'. The term 'propaganda' is 
problematic. It is something that is open to interpretation. Its use in this thesis is in relation to the anti-
Government material that was produced by the Council to stir up local opposition in Sheffield to the 
Thatcher Government. While this material is seen as 'propaganda' in this thesis it is merely the point 
of view of the author rather than a categorical definition of what is was.  
The Council could obstruct or attempt to bypass the implementation of key pieces of legislation while 
producing anti-Government 'propaganda' in an attempt to rally both local and national support for 
their actions. This approach is classed as 'theatrics' because of the lack of power these actions had in 
challenging central government. On the surface these theatrics gave the impression that the Council 
was mounting a significant challenge to Thatcher however the Council's actions did very little to 
                                                     
3
 For more information see J. Curran, Culture Wars (Edinburgh, 2005), G.  Eley, Forging Democracy (Oxford, 
2002) and R. Vinen, Thatcher's Britain: the Politics and Social Upheaval of the Thatcher Era  (London, 2009). 
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change the direction of her agenda.  What is surprising is that despite the conflict throwing up some 
contentious issues there is a clear lack of detailed contemporary literature on the central-local 
government relationship in Sheffield. This dissertation aims to help bridge this gap in the 
historiography.  
There is a wealth of literature which looks at central-local government relations on a national scale 
during the Thatcher era.4 These works are useful for providing the reader with an understanding of the 
general themes within the central-local government relationship and its history. Take for example 
Local Government and Thatcherism by Hugh Butcher, Ian Law, Robert Leach and Maurice Mullard. 
Their book provides a useful account of the history of local government, how it has developed and 
grown, up to 1979. It also discusses the differences between Municipal Toryism and Thatcherism, the 
relationship between local finance and public expenditure, Thatcherism and race, decentralisation, 
local economic development, public services and Thatcherism, and decentralisation. All of these 
issues are anchored to the wider conflict that took place between the Thatcher-led Conservative 
governments and local authorities. Martin Loughlin's Legality and Locality reviews central-local 
government relations during the same period but approaches it from a legal standpoint by 
investigating the role of law in the relationship instead of the much-analysed political and economic 
factors. Despite the many different approaches that are adopted what unites the literature is the 
general agreement on the adverse impact that Thatcher had on local government. The literature also 
discusses the methods that the opposing left-wing local authorities adopted to challenge Thatcherism. 
For example, Legality and Locality discusses rate-making in Liverpool in 1983-84. Through the use 
of legal loopholes Liverpool managed to put pressure on the Government and force it into adopting a 
'conciliatory approach' towards the Council's fixing of the budget and rate for 1984-85. It was hailed 
by the Council as a 'great victory'.5 It is this key theme in the historiography of how certain local 
authorities fought against Thatcherism that provides the basis for this dissertation. 
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 See T. Travers, The Politics of Local Government Finance (London, 1986), S. Lansley et al., Councils in 
Conflict (Basingstoke, 1989), H. Butcher et al., Local Government and Thatcherism (London, 1990), G. Stoker, 
The Politics of Local Government (Basingstoke, 1991), M. Loughlin, Legality and Locality (New York, 1996), 
and J. A. Chandler, Explaining Local Government (Manchester, 2007). 
5
 Loughlin, Legality and Locality, pp. 185-7. 
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What is missing from these works is any detailed account of what happened in Sheffield. This is not 
to say that Sheffield is completely ignored. As mentioned earlier Sheffield City Council took a 
leading role in the anti-Thatcher opposition from 1979 to 1985. The standing of the Council at the 
national level is not overlooked and the actions taken in Sheffield are frequently referred to in an 
attempt to give examples of the hostility between central and local government at the time. However, 
there is a clear lack of detailed investigations into how these actions were formulated and then 
implemented at the local level. This is not to say that no literature on central-local government 
relations in Sheffield exists. Martin Boddy and Colin Fudge's Local Socialism?, published in 1985, 
examines at the challenges faced by local authorities like Sheffield and the approaches they took to try 
and tackle them.6 A clear attempt is made to outline some of the economic and social initiatives that 
councils like Sheffield adopted in the fight against local government reform. They argue that there 
was a move away from class politics to identity politics within some of the Labour-controlled 
councils. However, Local Socialism? is based on research conducted at the height of the central-local 
government conflict and there is the need now to build on the findings made by Boddy and Fudge 
through the use of archival sources. David Blunkett and Keith Jackson's Democracy in Crisis, 
published in 1987, likewise is an extremely useful source in the investigation of central-local 
government relations in Sheffield, as it is written by two individuals involved in the conflict, however 
the story that they tell needs to be revaluated now that further archival material is available.7  
A few contemporary studies of central-local government relations in Sheffield are available. Sheffield 
Troublemakers by David Price explores Blunkett's role in the Council's defence against the attacks 
coming from central government.8 It evaluates the transformation of the political approach of the 
Council from the 1970s to the mid-1980s by discussing community politics, employment and the 
conflict over rate capping, among other issues. Yet this investigation is limited to a single chapter that 
is part of a wider work on radicalism in Sheffield from the late-eighteenth century to the end of the 
twentieth century. Where this dissertation aims to build on Price's work is through the extensive use 
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 M. Boddy & C. Fudge, Local Socialism?  (Basingstoke, 1985). 
7
 D. Blunkett & K. Jackson, Democracy in Crisis (London, 1987). 
8
 D. Price, Sheffield Troublemakers (Stroud, 2012). 
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of archival sources to provide a more detailed account on Sheffield City Council's fight against 
Thatcherism. Price's work provides a good general overview of what happened during this period. The 
aim of this dissertation is to fill in some of gaps that may be present by providing extra detail that the 
archival material may provide. 
The most relevant piece of contemporary literature on central-local government relations in Sheffield 
comes from Daisy Payling. Her 2014 article builds on Stuart Hall's notion of left-wing renewal and 
the idea of local socialism that had been discussed by Boddy and Fudge.9 It is an attempt to bridge a 
gap in the literature which has tended to focus more on the Greater London Council. Through the use 
of specific archival material, largely the minutes of the Council's Policy Committee, Payling analyses 
the Council's views on peace, race and gender. Payling concludes that in the attempt to combat 
Thatcherism the Council built 'a new constituency, but one that used class as a uniting force.'10 What 
is interesting about this conclusion is that it runs against a common theme in the historiography that 
Labour-controlled local authorities moved from class politics to identity politics in the fight against 
Thatcherism. Payling argues that in fact Sheffield connected the two by linking, for example, peace 
and coal mining.11 
The aim of this dissertation is to build on the work done by Price and Payling by exploring the 
central-local government conflict in Sheffield through the decision-making process of the Council and 
its various committees and sub-committees. By looking at the day-to-day business of the Council, 
through archival material available in the Sheffield Archives and Sheffield Central Studies Library, 
this research will highlight further how the Council opposed Thatcher's local government reforms. 
This is a Council-centric investigation so the role of local political movements, the focus of Payling's 
work, is not a major factor in this. This research also contributes to the historiography on the role of 
local government and local democracy in a centralised state, incorporating the work of George Jones 
and John Stewart.  
                                                     
9
 See D. Payling, '"Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire": Grassroots Activism and left-Wing Solidarity in 
1980s Sheffield', Twentieth Century British History, vol. 25, no. 4 (2014). 
10
 Ibid., p. 627. 
11
 Ibid., p. 627. 
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Jones and Stewart in a 2012 article have argued for an increased role for local government in 
acknowledging and responding to local needs: 'Our approach to local government builds on its elected 
authority. It sees local authorities as local government with a responsibility for the well-being of the 
local area and communities and citizens beyond the provision of services.'12 They originally argued 
their position in The Case for Local Government.13 They built on this view in a 2012 article14 in which 
they also summarised the key points in The Case for Local Government. Some of these were as 
follows: 'diffusion of power in a society that cannot afford concentrating power in one central 
location'; 'diversity of response that cannot afford the centralist risk of single solutions which may go 
wrong'; and 'localness of knowledge and response in a society that cannot afford the remoteness, 
rigidities and limitations of centralised bureaucracy'.15  
The overarching theme of the article is that centralism is dominant in the central-local government 
relationship. It is this view from Jones and Stewart which provides the basis for this thesis. The 
domination of centralism in the central-local government relationship is something that was ushered 
in during the Thatcher era and despite efforts under New Labour to tackle this it remains a significant 
issue in the relationship. Jones and Stewart argue that the 2010-15 Coalition Government's Localism 
Act 2011 is a prime example of centralist control over local government despite the name of the Act 
suggesting an increase in localism: 'The Act is based on the assumption that empowering communities 
and local government requires central-government prescription in orders and regulations - because it 
distrusts local government.'16 The key foundation of this dissertation is their view that 'genuine 
localism will be achieved only if there is a fundamental change in central-local relations brought 
about by change in the workings of central government and recognition of the constitutional position 
of local government.'17 There is the need for a change in the opinion of central government towards 
local government because central government cannot readily recognise what is the best course of 
action for addressing local issues due to the fact that it is not in day-to-day contact with local 
                                                     
12
 G. Jones & J. Stewart, 'Local Government: the Past, the Present and the Future', Public Policy and 
Administration, vol. 27, no. 4 (2012), p. 347. 
13
 G. Jones & J. Stewart, The Case for Local Government (London, 1985). 
14
 Jones & Stewart, 'Local Government: the Past, the Present and the Future'. 
15
 Ibid., pp. 348-9. 
16
 Ibid., p. 356. 
17
 Ibid., p. 355. 
8 
 
circumstances.18 Strong local government is essential. Britain is diverse, both socially and 
economically. What is the norm in Sheffield is different to that in Liverpool and what is the norm in 
Liverpool will be different to that in Birmingham.  The point being made here, perhaps in a somewhat 
oversimplified way, is that different areas of the country have different needs. A centralised 
government based in Whitehall cannot be expected to accurately assess and address the needs of 
different areas of the country. Local government is better placed for dealing with local needs.  Local 
representatives, accountable to their local electorate, have a better understanding of what needs to be 
done in their area. Turning local government into simply the administrators of the will of central 
government is damaging to society. 
While Jones and Stewart prescribe a remedy for the problem of centralism in the central-local 
government relationship this dissertation does not claim to do the same. Instead this investigation, 
building on their work, provides a detailed example of what can happen in a conflict between central 
and local government when the idea of centralism is dominant. Despite Thatcher being a limited 
government advocate she oversaw an increasing centralisation of power in Britain. This research will 
highlight both the tensions between central and local government during this centralisation of power 
and the limitations of local authorities like Sheffield to act in what they saw as the best interests of 
their voters. This is done through two separate but related investigations which look at housing policy 
and local government finance. The investigations link back to the ideas of Jones and Stewart. 
The first chapter of this dissertation investigates the central-local government battle in Sheffield 
surrounding the Housing Act 1980, primarily the conflict around the implementation of the Right to 
Buy, from November 1979 to May 1981. This is the first example of the implementation of centralism 
in the central-local government relationship. A three-phase perspective put forward in an article by 
Barrie Houlihan from 1987 is used to set out the Council's defence against the Act. Houlihan 
constructed this perspective by looking at the opposition to the Right to Buy from Newcastle-under-
Lyme and Stoke on Trent, two Labour-controlled local authorities at the time of implementing the 
Housing Act 1980. The three phases of this perspective are as follows: 'non-cooperation, obstruction 
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 Ibid., p. 366. 
9 
 
and finally compliance.'19 For this investigation the first phase of 'non-cooperation' spans from the 7th 
November 1979 to the 8th August 1980. 'Obstruction' follows on from this until the 12th May 1981. 
The final phase, 'compliance', then occurs once the Council buckles under the pressure from central 
government and moves ahead reluctantly with pushing through Right to Buy sales. It will be shown 
that the Council's defence in this chapter was based around two methods: obstruction and 
'propaganda'. Due to the centralisation of power in the central-local government relationship the 
Council were unable to directly challenge the Housing Act 1980 and so could only obstruct it at the 
administrative level and attack it with Council-produced 'propaganda'. 
The Council's approach to challenging central government, obstruction and 'propaganda', is seen again 
in the second chapter. The chapter analyses the much broader central-local government conflict over 
local government finance between June 1979 and May 1985. What is important in understanding this 
conflict is Blunkett's role, as both Leader of the Council and Chairman of the Policy Committee, in 
formulating the defence against local government finance reform. The timeline of the chapter is 
structured around three key pieces of legislation in Thatcher's fight to reduce local government 
expenditure: the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, the Local Government Finance Act 
1982 and the Rates Act 1984. June 1979 to July 1982 sees the drawing of the battles lines over local 
government finance. There were some early skirmishes between the Thatcher Government and 
Sheffield City Council before and after the passing of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 
1980 and the war of words began to heat up. The second phase of the conflict, July 1982 to June 1984, 
saw the escalation of the conflict with the passing of the Local Government Finance Act 1982. It was 
here that the Council's use of 'propaganda' to mount a challenge against central government actions 
increased. June 1984 to May 1985 resulted in the defeat of the Council in the face of rate capping. The 
Rates Act 1984, giving central government to power to prescribe a legal rate, proved to be the final 
hammer blow to the resolve of the Council. When the Council were presented with the option of 
venturing into illegality they decided not to, much like in chapter one. However, on this occasion the 
outcome was not an organised retreat in the face of government pressure but a the result of a split 
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 B. Houlihan, 'Policy Implementation and Central-Local Government Relations in England: The Examples of 
the Sale of Council Houses and Area Improvement', Housing Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (1987), p. 105. 
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within the Labour Group itself. The Group were split between those who were willing to venture into 
illegality and refuse to set a rate and those who wanted to admit defeat and agree to set the legal 
prescribed rate.  
The two chapters are linked through the futility of the Council's defence against Thatcher's policies 
for housing and local government finance. Due to the dominance of centralism in the central-local 
government relationship, as argued by Jones and Stewart, there was very little chance of the Council 
ever mounting a practical political challenge. The message from central government was clear: local 
authorities would follow laws passed in Parliament. It will be seen that Sheffield City Council's only 
options were obstruction and 'propaganda'. The Council could obstruct the changes being made to 
housing and local government finance while at the same time drastically increasing the amount of 
Council-produced 'propaganda' attacking central government policy. This 'propaganda' would give the 
impression that the Council were successful in thwarting central government policy when in fact they 
were simply obstructing its implementation in the hope that a Labour government would soon be 
elected. It will be shown that the Council on the surface appeared to be an opponent to Thatcher with 
equal power when in fact they were simply stalling the inevitable in the hope of soon being saved by a 
newly elected Labour government.  
11 
 
Chapter One: 
Sheffield City Council and the Housing Act 1980 
 
Introduction  
The Housing Act 1980 and the resulting central-local government conflict around the sale of council 
dwellings in Sheffield is one of the first examples of overt tension between Sheffield City Council and 
the Thatcher Government. The Act, given the Royal Assent on the 8th August and coming into force 
early the following month, introduced the Right to Buy for council tenants. This was the first concrete 
challenge from central government to the powerful position over housing that local authorities 
presided over. Council tenants who had lived in their homes for at least three years were entitled to 
purchase their dwelling from the council for a 33 per cent discount on the market value of a house; a 
44 per cent discount was in place for flats. This discount rose by 1 per cent for every extra year of 
secure tenancy up to a maximum of 50 per cent. Sheltered housing and dwellings designed or adapted 
specifically for pensioners and the physically disabled were exempt. It also gave tenants the right to a 
100 per cent council mortgage and the right to defer completion of the sale for up to two years from 
the date on which a claim to exercise the Right to Buy was made. If a tenant was to sell the home that 
they had purchased from the council under the Act, within five years of the initial sale, the capital 
gain was shared between the individual and the local authority.1  
Section 23 of the Act gave the Secretary of State for the Environment the power to intervene in the 
sale of council dwellings if it was felt that the tenant's Right to Buy was being frustrated or blocked: 
 Where it appears to the Secretary of State that tenants generally, or a tenant or tenants 
of a particular landlord, or tenants of a description of landlords have or may have 
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difficulty in exercising the right to buy effectively and expeditiously, he may, after 
giving the landlord or landlords notice in writing of his intention to do so and while 
the notice is in force, use his powers under the following provisions of this section; 
and any such notice shall be deemed to be given 72 hours after it has been sent.2 
It was Section 23 that would be the catalyst for much of the central-local government conflict 
concerning the provisions of the Housing Act 1980. For the first time the Secretary of State had the 
power to overrule local authorities when it came to the sale of council houses, including the ability to 
cut out the local authority completely and force through any ongoing sales. The Act also changed the 
way that local authority housing programmes were funded by central government. The Act stated that 
from 1981-82 certain existing subsidies and contributions from central government were to be 
replaced with a housing subsidy. This would ultimately see the level of central government funding for 
local authority housing decline across England and Wales throughout the 1980s.3 
This investigation into the central-local government conflict over housing in Sheffield is based upon a 
three-phase perspective outlined in the work of Barrie Houlihan discussed in the introduction to this 
dissertation.4 Houlihan's work examined the Right to Buy in Newcastle-under-Lyme and Stoke-on-
Trent, two Labour-controlled local authorities in 1980. The three phases of this perspective are as 
follows: 'non-cooperation, obstruction and finally compliance.'5 For the purpose of this investigation 
the phase of 'non-cooperation' runs from the 7th November 1979, when the Council's Housing 
Committee first considered the Housing Bill, to the 8th August 1980. The second phase, 'obstruction', 
then takes place until the 12th May 1981. This then ushered in the final phase of 'compliance' from the 
12th May which saw the Council's staunch opposition to the Right to Buy capitulate when faced with 
the threat of intervention under Section 23. The three-phase approach that is used in this investigation 
                                                     
2
 Department of the Environment, Housing Act 1980, Section 23 (1), p. 21, Available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/51/pdfs/ukpga_19800051_en.pdf [Accessed: 09/01/2017]. 
3
 For a full explanation of the key provisions of the Housing Act 1980 see P. Liell, Council Houses and the 
Housing Act 1980 (London, 1981). 
4
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5
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differs from Houlihan's as the three phases - 'non-cooperation', 'obstruction' and 'compliance' - have 
been made fit the timeline of the conflict in Sheffield. 
Housing Policy before the Housing Act 1980 
The sale of council houses was not a revolutionary idea on housing policy when the Thatcher 
Government came to power in May 1979. It was, in fact, an idea 'as old as council housing itself.'6 
Individual local authorities always had the ability to sell council houses to sitting tenants, but before 
the Housing Act 1980 there was nothing like Section 23 on the statute book giving central government 
the power to force through council house sales. It was not a legal right for a tenant to be able to buy 
their local authority dwelling, something which the 1980 Act would change. (There were, as a result, 
very few incidents of central-local government conflict around the sale of council dwellings from 
1919, when Exchequer subsidy for council housing was introduced, to 1979.) There were low figures 
for sales of council dwellings during this period compared to those after 1979. What central 
government could do was influence public opinion towards council house sales. 
From 1945-79 the Labour Party did not press the idea of selling local authority housing but neither did 
they rescind the ability of councils to sell their housing stock. The Callaghan Administration in 1977 
flirted with the idea of introducing some form of a Right to Buy when its housing study found that 
owning a home was for most people a 'basic and natural desire'.7 Significant figures within the Labour 
Party, such as Harold Wilson's press secretary Joe Haines and Jim Callaghan's economic advisor 
Gavyn Davis, wondered whether renting from a local authority was a satisfying way for people to 
live, and whether council housing itself would remain affordable for central government.8 Although 
coming close to doing so, Labour decided against adopting a drastic sale of council dwellings because 
it was not seen as a top priority for the electorate. Their 1979 general election manifesto stressed the 
continuation of local authorities playing a key role in meeting housing needs. While Labour was not 
opposed to the sale of council houses at a fair price and at no damage to a local authority's ability to 
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 A. Beckett, Promised You a Miracle (London, 2016), p. 219. 
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8
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meet housing needs, they continued to oppose the sale of council houses in areas of serious housing 
need. However, they did commit to some of the other policies that would later become part of the 
Housing Act 1980: security of tenure; the right to a written tenancy; and the right to improve the 
home. With hindsight this was a missed opportunity by Labour because the Tories were to place 
council home sales as a central part of their 1979 election campaign. 
Pressure to increase the number of council dwellings that were sold had come from the Conservatives. 
From the 1950s they were the main force that changed the status quo around housing policy in 
Britain. In 1952 Churchill's Government, with Harold Macmillan as the Minister of Housing and 
Local Government, set up 'a clear framework for sales'9 and they reiterated their desire to see a much 
wider expansion of the distribution of property. However, they did not actively encourage local 
authorities to sell, and sales year on year were lower than expected.10 In 1960 2,889 local authority 
dwellings were sold, 3,590 in 1965 and 6,816 in 1970.11 This move to increase the sale of council 
dwellings was because 'the Conservatives considered that the extraordinary shortages [in housing] 
occasioned by war had been remedied'.12 In 1951 they had increased subsidies for housing to 
incentivise investment by the construction industry, 'but once the target of 300,000 houses had been 
reached in 1955 the subsidies were reduced, and by the end of 1956 they had been removed on all 
general needs housing other than one-bedroom flats for the elderly.'13 Arguments were made that the 
role of the local authority was solely to undertake slum clearance while general housing need would 
be met by private enterprise.14 
It was to await the Heath Administration before the idea of forcing local authorities to sell their 
housing stock became part of the political norm. Restrictions on the sale of council houses, put in 
place by Labour in 1968, were scrapped in 1970. These restrictions had been put in place after the 
more radical left wing of the Labour Party had 'put [Anthony] Greenwood, the Minister for Housing 
and Local Government, under pressure to restrict the sale of council houses by Conservative (and 
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many Labour) local authorities.'15 After lifting the restrictions there were 17,214 sales in 1971, a peak 
of 45,878 in 1972 and 34,334 in 1973 as local authorities, mainly Conservative-controlled, went on a 
selling spree, facilitated by a positive economic situation.16 Disappointment then set in within the 
Conservative Party hierarchy as sales nosedived to 4,657, 2,723 and 6,090 for 1974, 1975 and 1976 
respectively.17 This enormous drop in sales, according to Forrest and Murie, 'inevitably aroused 
comment within the Conservative Party'18 and when in opposition between 1974 and 1979 they 
became 'more vociferous and determined exponents of a Right to Buy for council tenants.'19 The 
number of households renting from a local authority was steadily increasing, reaching 32.1 per cent in 
1978, however owner-occupation was also increasing, surpassing 50 per cent in 1971 and reaching 54 
per cent in 1978.20 
Increasing home ownership by introducing a Right to Buy was integral to Thatcher's traditional 
Conservative ideals. By moving council tenants from public to private sector housing it would help to 
create a society of individual home owners, more responsible for themselves and less dependent on 
the state, while reducing the power that local authorities had over housing. It was a move from 
collectivism towards individualism. It also fitted into Thatcher's economic goal of drastically reducing 
public expenditure in an effort to resurrect the stagnant British economy and tackle inflation. Council 
housing would get 'caught in a pincer movement between an ideological commitment to individualism 
and the public expenditure imperatives of monetarism'.21 The connection between the Right to Buy 
and Thatcher's monetarist beliefs is slightly skewed considering that sales of council houses would 
sometimes be below market values. It was fair to say that the policy was an attempt to win over 
working class voters that potentially would vote Conservative. The Home Ownership and 
Construction Industry Policy Group, set up by the Conservatives on the 9th June 1975, published a 
report the following month advising them to keep increased home ownership and council house sales 
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as key party policy. This was, according to the report, what most families wanted and would break 
'the growing monopoly of council housing in many parts of the country'.22 
In 1979, the Conservative manifesto dedicated one and a half pages to housing, more than to 
education, social security, health and welfare or the elderly and disabled. The traditional conservative 
ideas around private property and housing were present: 'A Property-Owning Democracy'; the desire 
for 'more people to have the security and satisfaction of owning property'; and the promise to 'give 
council and new town tenants the legal right to buy their homes'.2324 The handsome majority that the 
electorate gave them in May seemed to suggest to Thatcher that housing was a key issue for the 
British people. She proudly stated on the 15th May that 'thousands of people in council houses and 
new towns came out to support us for the first time because they wanted a chance to buy their own 
homes.'25  After dedicating so much space in their manifesto to housing and their desire to increase 
owner-occupier numbers the election victory left the Conservatives emboldened to act on the 
promises they had made. The Housing Act 1980 was the end product of these promises. 
Between 1945 and 1979 Sheffield City Council gained both national and international acclaim for its 
housing policies. As the country steadily recovered from the effects of the Second World War and the 
resources became more and more available for local authorities to increase the number of council 
houses, Sheffield seized the opportunity to do so. Houses under management by Sheffield City 
Council rose from 40,000 in 1951 to 75,000 in 1973. The Council were active in both slum clearance 
and house building.26 This impressive house building scheme undertaken by the Council was made to 
work with Conservative governments as well as Labour governments. It was, according to David 
Price, 'largely a Conservative Government that paid for Labour's iconic Park Hill Flats, built around 
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1960, when Roy Hattersley was chairman of housing.'27 Complexes like the Park Hill Flats, the 
'streets in the sky', were what would attract international attention to both the city and its architect J. 
Lewis Wolmersley, who had been appointed by the Council in 1953.28 The Callaghan Administration 
oversaw sizeable cuts to local authority spending as the economy struggled to recover from the 1973-
75 recession. This presented a challenge to the reputation of Sheffield as 'a city intent on providing 
good local services'29 including housing. Despite this challenge, the total number of households 
renting from the Council had risen to 93,29030 by April 1979. Although there were elements of 
conflict surrounding the reduction in central government funding for housing these were dealt with 
amicably. They were minor blips in the relationship Sheffield City Council had with central 
government. 
The Housing Act 1980 and Sheffield City Council 
On the 17th May 1979, Michael Heseltine, now the Secretary of State for the Environment, made a 
speech to the House of Commons announcing his plans for a Housing Bill which would be introduced 
to Parliament before the end of the year. Sheffield City Council's Housing Committee was chaired by 
two Labour councillors Dr Peter Jones until May 1980 and then Clive Betts. The Committee first 
considered the Housing Bill at a special meeting held on the 7th November 1979. It was here that the 
phase of 'non-cooperation' began. Referring to consultation papers provided by the Government the 
Committee discussed the Right to Buy and the new housing subsidy system, among other elements of 
the Bill. In terms of the Right to Buy the Committee stated that 'this Council has long supported 
owner-occupation as a form of tenure [...] However, the Council also recognises that for many 
families renting is preferable, or indeed the only option open to them.'31 They deplored the proposals 
from the Government to compel local authorities to sell council dwellings.32 The mentioning of 
tenants whose only option was to rent from the Council can be viewed as a weak excuse for their 
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opposition to the sale of council houses because those tenants may not have even been able to exercise 
the Right to Buy because of their financial situation. However, the Council saw the Right to Buy as a 
policy that would diminish the housing stock available for housing those people. Previously, tenants 
who wanted to own their property would have moved out of their Council-owned property, freeing it 
up for the rehousing of another individual or family. The Right to Buy would alter this trend by taking 
the property out of the Council's control altogether if the occupier was to exercise the Right to Buy. 
The new housing subsidy system, while in principle similar to that proposed by the previous 
Government, was seen by the Committee to 'lead to a gradual diminution of local authority control in 
contrast to the Government's stated aims of increasing local democracy.'33 It seems that the powerful 
position of Labour at the local level in Sheffield equated with local democracy. A threat to the 
Council's power was thus a threat to local democracy. An amendment was put forward by two 
Conservative members of the Housing Committee, Graham Cheetham and Christine Smith, towards 
the end of the meeting: 'That this Council welcomes the principle contained within the Tenants' 
Charter and the separate Consultation Paper on the Right to Buy Council Dwellings'34. This was 
rejected by five votes to eleven.  
The Tories introduced the Bill to Parliament on the 19th December, before the Christmas recess, and it 
received its second reading on the 15th January 1981. In hindsight, considering the conflict that would 
emerge between the Thatcher Government and local authorities (including Sheffield) concerning 
Section 23 of the Act, it received little scrutiny from MPs in comparison to other aspects of the Bill: 
'The relative lack of attention and controversy surrounding it [Section 23] during the legislative 
process [was] surprising.'35 More focus was placed on the general concept of selling council dwellings 
rather than the power that Section 23 gave the Secretary of State to force through these sales. It was a 
missed opportunity for the opposition to present an attractive argument against the Housing Bill. 
Frederick Mulley, Labour MP for Sheffield Park, made the position of Sheffield City Council clear to 
Parliament, echoing what had been said by the Housing Committee in November 1979:  
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The Sheffield City Council is totally opposed to the mandatory right to purchase 
council dwellings, but it has no objection to home ownership. For a number of years 
the Council has used its resources to build houses for sale. It has been successful in 
providing houses for direct sale. However, that is different from selling rented 
accommodation which belongs to the city.36 
It is worth mentioning that the scheme of building houses for sale, which Mulley referenced appeared 
to be merely hollow rhetoric. Of the 5,850 dwellings completed by Sheffield City Council from 1976-
79 only 112 were built for sale.37  
Clive Betts argued against the sale of dwellings owned by the Council in Sheffield Forward. The 
January 1980 issue included a special briefing by Betts in which he laid down the Council's opposition 
to Right to Buy. The first argument was that the sale of Council houses 'places the interests of a 
minority of individuals above those of the community as a whole with disastrous results for many of 
the less well-off in society.' It was also seen that the Council would fall victim to further financial loss 
on top of the cuts already proposed by the Government if the Right to Buy was implemented: 'The 
financial loss to the public sector as a whole will be even greater.' Revenue from rents would be 
reduced as the number of rent payers decreased and sales of dwellings below the market value would 
add further insult to injury.  Finally, Betts argued that the sale of Council houses would erode local 
democracy and raise the question of 'how far central government has the right to enforce not merely 
the principle of council house sales but also the detailed way in which they should be enacted.'38 The 
message was already being publicised to the people of Sheffield that the Council was staunchly 
opposed to the Housing Act 1980 and the Right to Buy. 
On the 5th March, 1980, the Housing Committee discussed details from the Department of the 
Environment (DoE) concerning the Council's Housing Investment Programme (HIP) allocation for the 
1980-81 financial year. £21.185 million had been set aside for Sheffield City Council by central 
government to go towards slum clearance, new building, municipalisation and energy conservation 
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schemes, to name but a few. This was down from £27.549 million for 1979-80, while the estimated 
HIP spending for that year was £24.549 million.39 It was forecast that almost the total of the HIP 
allocation for 1980-81 would be swallowed up by prior commitments for the year, drastically cutting 
the number of planned new builds from 893 to 100. 
It is clear to see that the DoE, set on making cuts to public expenditure where possible, was trying to 
reduce Sheffield City Council's spending on housing. The situation shows a Conservative Government 
department forcing its monetarist economic policy onto a Labour-held local authority, regardless of 
how it would cripple the Council's plans to increase the number of Council dwellings and to modernise 
the current housing stock. The Council had asked for £44 million40 for the 1980-81 HIP allocation, 
which to fiscal conservatives like Heseltine and Thatcher would have raised a few eyebrows. The DoE 
may have wanted to send a message to this unruly Labour-held local authority to show that the days of 
high spending schemes were over and the new rules of Thatcherism's frugal economics had to be 
abided by. The Housing Committee decided to approve a revised programme for 1980-81, drawn up 
by the Chief Executive and the Director of Housing in the wake of the actual HIP allocation from 
central government, and agreed that further correspondence with the DoE was necessary to try to 
increase the allocation so that the full housing needs of Sheffield could be met.41 The DoE would 
submit a reply to the Committee in May explaining that 'it would not be possible to increase the 
Council's allocation as the available resources for housing had been wholly distributed.'42 
The 1980-81 HIP allocation came up as a Notice of Motion at a meeting of the full Council on the 5th 
March. It was moved and then seconded by Dr Peter Jones and Clive Betts respectively that 'this 
Council condemns H.M. Government's Housing Investment Programme' because it 'falls short of its 
needs and will adversely affect the interests of owner occupiers and tenants alike'.43 Furthermore, 'the 
Council demands that the Government rethink its policy and provide the Council with an allocation 
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which will enable the Council to preserve and improve its housing standards.'44 Graham Cheetham and 
fellow Conservative councillor Cliff Godber tried to amend the motion to modify this position. Rather 
than condemning the HIP allocation they moved that in light of the report by the Chief Executive and 
the Director of Housing 'the Housing Committee be instructed to draw up as realistic and balanced a 
programme as possible within the limits laid down'.45 This amended motion was rejected and the 
original motion was put to the vote and carried 58 votes to 18 with 1 abstention. Cheetham was not as 
supportive of the cut to the HIP allocation as the minutes for the 5th March suggest. An article in The 
Star from the 27th February, entitled 'Cuts Protest from a Tory to a Tory!', highlighted Cheetham's 
reservations about the HIP allocation. According to Cheetham he had sent a letter to Heseltine 
outlining his concerns about 'the effects of the "sizeable cutback" facing Sheffield', and he claimed that 
'there was a danger that the council, as a housing authority, would not be able to fulfil its obligations 
"across the board" in the public and private sectors.' However, he also said that the Council 'should 
draw up a balanced and realistic programme' according to the HIP allocation they would be given. 
Cheetham believed that 'if Labour would agree to sell Council houses, this could raise about £2 
million to help ease the housing department's financial problems.'46 
The Housing Committee received a petition later in March, submitted by the Head of Administration 
and Legal Department, which contained 185 signatures protesting against the central government cuts 
to Sheffield City Council's housing expenditure. The Committee decided on the 24th March that the 
petition should be sent to the Secretary of State for the Environment for his consideration, along with 
statements detailing the Council's stance against the decision to cut the HIP allocation for 1980-81.47 
Furthermore, a letter was sent from the Director of Housing, Harry Skidmore, to the Secretary of State 
for the Environment on the 25th March detailing the 'serious consequences'48 that the HIP allocation cut 
would have for both employment and the housing situation in Sheffield. The petition was discussed in 
the House of Commons on the 21st May. Frank Hooley, MP for Sheffield Heeley, told the House that 
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the cut to the HIP allocation would disrupt housebuilding for the elderly, resulting in more pressure on 
'geriatric' services and the 'geriatric' wards of hospitals. At the same time it would reduce employment 
in the housebuilding sector, reduce the level of modernisation of the current stock, affect 
improvements to the private sector, reduce mortgages and loans for improvements, and cut back the 
Council's schemes for energy saving.49 Hooley was clear that the HIP allocation was too small: 
The allocation for Sheffield in 1980-81 is £21,185,000. Last year, the city spent £24.5 
million. Allowing for inflation, that is equivalent in 1980 to about £28 million. In real 
terms, there has been a cut of 25 per cent in the HIP. As Sheffield is a dynamic and 
go-ahead housing authority, it asked for £44 million. It has, therefore, suffered a cut of 
50 per cent. If the figure of £24.5 million is adjusted for a rate of inflation of about 21 
per cent - it may be higher than that later in the year - it represents a cut of 25 per cent. 
That is serious.50 
Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, Geoffrey Finsberg, made it clear that there was no 
sympathy from the DoE for Sheffield City Council: 
I say to the hon. Member and to the House that it really is time that Sheffield began to 
face up to the realities of the situation and took an objective look at its programme and 
policies, bearing in mind the wide variety of options which are open to the council 
[…]. It really is time that Sheffield stopped living in a political dream world of its own 
and began to live in the real world. That then would be, perhaps, more in keeping with 
the interests of its ratepayers, its tenants, those on its waiting list and the nation. That 
is what Sheffield could do to help itself, and I am sure that as a very faithful 
representative of his constituents and their interests the hon. Gentleman will convey 
those points to Sheffield. I hope that it will learn from them.51 
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Towards the end of May the Housing Bill was about to enter the House of Lords for debate. It was 
becoming increasingly clear at this point that the mandatory sale of council dwellings would sooner or 
later be put on the statute book. In response to this 104 tenants of council dwellings at Loxley and 
Stannington submitted a petition to the Council 'requesting that they be given the opportunity to 
purchase their dwellings.'52 On the 19th May it was decided that the request of the petitioners should be 
blocked because the sale of council dwellings was not Council policy and they did not want to reduce 
the housing stock in areas where there was a shortage of council housing; Loxley and Stannington 
were areas deemed to have an acute shortage of such housing.53 Cheetham and Smith tried to amend 
the decision of the Housing Committee. Their amendment put forward that the petitioners would be 
informed that a scheme for the sale of council dwellings was being prepared by the Council in line 
with what was set out in the Housing Bill. Once again this attempt by Conservative councillors to 
realign the Council's thinking with that of central government was defeated. The response from the 
Council to the petitioners was a clear example of 'non-cooperation'; they were unwilling to even 
consider putting in place a scheme for the sale of Council dwellings. The Star reported that Labour 
councillor Joe Thomas had replied to the petition by saying that 'buying a Council house would be 
"one of the most anti-social acts" a tenant could be involved in.' This was because those people from 
Loxley and Stannington who were wanting to buy their dwellings from the Council had once been on 
the waiting list themselves, and the selling of 'Council houses would hit those who were on the list 
now and those who were waiting to move out of high rise flats.'54  
Due to the cut in central government money for local authority housing the Chief Executive and the 
Director of Housing deemed it necessary to increase the rents of Council dwellings by an average of 
£1.98 per week (32 per cent), except on short-life properties declared for demolition and those let as 
students' accommodation. The Housing Committee decided that the rent increases would be brought 
into effect on the 11th August with the first payment due on the 18th. Authority was also given for a 
letter, already submitted by the Chairman of the Committee, to be sent to tenants explaining the 
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reasons for the rent increases.55 The letter did not hold back in its attack on the Thatcher Government's 
housing policy: 'It is a very large increase and I regret that the Council was unable to keep it below this 
figure. However, I would point out that Government policies are largely responsible for it.'56 It was, 
according to the letter, because of the high level of interest rates which was adding £1,298,000 to the 
housing bill, the high level of inflation at around 20 per cent which the Council also had to take into 
account, and because the Government had cut money for housing in Sheffield. These issues were 
'completely beyond the control of the Council and […] a result of Government policy.'57 The average 
rent increase for Council houses each year since November 1975 had been between 7 and 15 per cent 
so this increase of 32 per cent would have been a shock to Council tenants as it exceeded the rate of 
inflation.58 The letter from Clive Betts to tenants was an attempt to absolve the Council from any 
responsibility when it came to problems with the housing situation in Sheffield. Any criticism that the 
Council would become vulnerable to when it came to housing could be passed on to the Thatcher 
Government, specifically Heseltine and the DoE. The blanket excuse from the Council of central 
government policy strangling their housing programme diverted attention away from the actual 
planning and implementation of the programme by the Council. It was a clear attempt to stoke up 
more fervent opposition to the Thatcher Government among the people of the Sheffield. 
After the Housing Act 1980 had become law on the 8th August the full Council discussed the sale of 
Council houses at a meeting on the 3rd September. It came up as a Notice of Motion, moved by 
Cheetham and Smith, to set out the response of the Council to the Act. The two Conservative 
councillors moved that the Council should recognise 'its duty to comply with the provisions of the 
Housing Act 1980 concerning the sale of Council houses, which provisions come into force on 3rd 
October, 1980'.59 Along with this they moved that the Housing Committee should set up an 
appropriate procedure for processing Right to Buy applications from Council tenants, with the 
response to these applications being given within the statutory period. Finally, where the Right to Buy 
                                                     
55
 SA, CA-HOU/2/18, Meeting of the Housing Committee, 23rd  June 1980, p. 3. 
56
 SA, MPB/3/54, Letter to Council Tenants, 13th June 1980, Appendix 6. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 SCSL, 352.042 SQ, Meeting of the City Council, 3rd December 1980, p. 5. 
59
 SA, CA-MIN/118, Council Summons, 3rd September 1980, p. 325. 
25 
 
has been established the sale of the property should be completed with the minimum of delay.60 It was 
then moved by Betts as an amendment, seconded by Labour councillor Howard Knight, that the 
Council 're-affirms its belief that the sale of Council houses is not in the public interest' and 'deplores 
the wilful refusal of the Government to listen to warnings of the Opposition parties, some 
Conservative Councils and voluntary bodies concerned with […] the crisis in housing that this will 
bring about'.61 A crucial part of the amendment was with regards to publicity. The amendment stated 
that the Council 'requests the appropriate Chairmen and officers of this Council to take whatever steps 
necessary to inform the citizens of Sheffield of the Council's policies'.62 The repercussions of this part 
of the amendment would later play a significant role in creating greater conflict, not just with the 
Thatcher Government but between the different political parties on the Council. The amendment was 
passed 50 votes to 18 with 2 abstaining.  
Now that the Right to Buy was written into law the Council's opposition to it moved from 'non-
cooperation' to 'obstruction'. They could no longer outright refuse to adhere to the Right to Buy 
because of Section 23 of the Act. An outright refusal to implement the Right to Buy would prompt the 
Secretary of State to intervene. However, they could adopt methods to undermine it. The meeting of 
the Housing Committee on the 20th October was a significant moment in the 'obstruction' phase and 
the development of the Council's opposition to the Housing Act 1980. By this point the Act had come 
into effect and council house tenants across the country were issuing their Right to Buy claims to their 
respective local authorities. At the meeting the Committee established what was to be a key method in 
obstructing the sale of council dwellings in Sheffield. It was to do with the staffing implications that 
came with Part I of the Act, namely the Right to Buy. It was decided that 'a report outlining the 
staffing implications and associated costs of Part I of the Housing Act 1980'63 be prepared for the 
Staffing Sub-Committee and that 'consideration of the question of the responsibility for dealing with 
[…] applications to buy Council houses and flats, be deferred pending the consideration […] of the 
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report on staffing implications.'64 On the surface this seemed like a routine decision to take. A new 
piece of legislation required the creation of new roles within the Council that needed to be filled. The 
staffing implications concerned, among other things, the creation of a valuation panel that would 
undertake the valuations of Council dwellings where a tenant had exercised the Right to Buy. This 
report would be delayed time and time again. Any questions raised at meetings of the Council around 
the sale of council dwellings, in this case the lack of such sales, would for the rest of 1980 and into 
1981 be met by the same response: '[This Council] awaits the report requested on the staffing 
implications of Part I of the Housing Act 1980 as is the normal procedure in determining resources to 
be utilised in the undertaking of new areas of work.'65 The delaying of Right to Buy applications was a 
covert tactic adopted by several local authorities, both Labour and Conservative, who were opposed to 
the sale of council dwellings.66 It had the desired effect in the short-term for those on Sheffield City 
Council who opposed the Right to Buy. For 1980-81 3,646 Right to Buy claims were received, 2,465 
were accepted but no sales occurred.67 Ultimately the Council were exploiting a loophole in the Act. 
The legislation put in place a time limit for a local authority to reply to a Right to Buy claim but failed 
to provide a similar time limit for the completion of a sale, nor did it outline a particular quota for the 
number of sales that should occur. The behaviour of the Council would soon attract the attention of 
Heseltine and the DoE. 
Before the resolution had been passed Cheetham and Smith put forward an amendment. It highlighted 
the actions of Betts with regards to the Housing Act 1980 following the meeting of the Council on the 
3rd September. The two Conservative councillors put forward that the Committee deprecated the 
following actions taken by the Chairman:  
Authorising advertisements to be placed in the press opposing the sale of Council 
houses; authorising the printing of leaflets opposing the sale of Council houses for 
issue to all tenants; giving instructions to members of the staff not to issue right to 
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buy application forms; issuing a letter to all tenants who have lodged right to buy 
application forms inferring that they are anti-social; and entering into negotiations 
with members of the staff regarding the implementation of the Act without 
reference to the Staffing Sub-Committee.68  
As well as deprecating these actions, they put forward that the Committee 'welcomes the right to buy 
provisions […] and instructs the officers of the Council to take all necessary steps to ensure that the 
full provisions of this part of the Act are implemented effectively and expeditiously.'69 The use of the 
words 'effectively' and 'expeditiously' is noteworthy as it was essentially a direct quote from Section 
23 of the Housing Act 1980. This amendment put forward by Cheetham and Smith was rejected 13 
votes to 5 with 1 abstention. Two Labour councillors, Helen Jackson and Janet Fiore, put forward an 
amendment which stated that at the end of the resolution the words 'on the understanding that no extra 
cost is incurred by the Council'70 should be added. This attempt to censure the actions of Betts by two 
fellow Labour councillors was rejected 9 votes to 5 with 5 choosing to abstain. 
There then followed the matter of the actual sale of Council houses. A resolution, passed by 13 votes 
to 7, stated that the Council 're-affirms its position on the sale of Council houses and criticises Part I of 
the Housing Act 1980 as a fundamental attack on the freedom and democracy of local Councils'.71 
Furthermore, the Council 'calls upon Her Majesty's Opposition to declare that it will, as soon as it 
obtains power, give local authorities the right, where houses are sold against their wishes, to have the 
first option to buy back those houses at a price which gives no financial loss to the Authority and no 
financial gain to the householder for the discounts currently offered'.72 Recognising the cuts by the 
DoE to housing expenditure, this idea that the Council would be losing further available funding 
through the Right to Buy was prominent throughout the resolution. For example, if a Council house 
purchaser could not keep up the mortgage repayments to the Council, they would take the normal 
steps to re-possess the home and potentially evict the inhabitants. The resolution also made it Council 
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policy that tenants wanting to make improvements to their home and those on the Council house 
waiting list or transfer list, would have to make it clear whether or not they would be likely to 
purchase the home from the Council.73 What became increasingly clear from the resolution was the 
Council's attitude towards those who wanted to use the Right to Buy. They were regarded almost as 
second-class tenants. The desire of the tenant to exercise the Right to Buy was seen as a betrayal to the 
Council which, in its opinion, had provided the people of Sheffield with affordable, good quality 
housing for many years. The Council's focus was now solely placed on those tenants who would not 
exercise the Right to Buy. The slightest suggestion from a tenant that they wanted to buy would push 
them to the back of the queue in terms of the waiting list, repairs, home improvements and insulation 
grants. 
There was a degree of irony within the resolution. So much of the resolution set out the Council's 
opinion that the Right to Buy should not leave the Council subject to any further losses in housing 
expenditure on top of the cuts already made by Heseltine and the DoE. However, when it came to the 
matter of publicity the Council were happy to spend whatever was necessary, and dedicate as much 
Council staff time as necessary, to produce 'propaganda' opposing the Housing Act 1980: 
[This Council] instructs the respective Chairmen and officers of the Housing and 
Policy Committees to give publicity to the contents of this resolution to all applicants 
seeking to purchase Council houses, to draw to their attention any other implications 
and to take those steps necessary to protect the interests of all Council tenants and the 
wider community, as well as the position of the Council workforce, in pursuance of a 
policy to ensure that all the implications of activating Part I of the Housing Act are 
explored with individual tenants.74 
The 'propaganda' campaign mounted against the Housing Act 1980 and the Right to Buy was a clear 
example of the political theatre that the Council were engaged in. Left without any political avenue 
through which to alter, or completely transform central government housing policy, the Council only 
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had two ways in which they could try and challenge the Act. The first, as seen earlier in this chapter, 
was to stall the implementation of the Right to Buy, but this would be a short-term solution at best. 
The second was the production of 'propaganda' which directly challenged the Government and its 
housing policy. This 'propaganda' was nothing more than political theatre. Despite the production and 
dissemination of anti-Right to Buy 'propaganda', explaining the disadvantages of the Right to Buy and 
how it should be fought against, there was nothing the Council could do to halt the implementation of 
it for the foreseeable future. It was hoped that the people of Sheffield would be sympathetic to the 
arguments being put forward in this Council-produced 'propaganda' and would view the Council as a 
powerful figure in this conflict. An impression would be given that the Council would not give up 
without a fight. It was assumed that the people of Sheffield would not see the theatrics for what they 
really were.  
The cost of this publicity campaign was brought up at a Housing Committee meeting the following 
month. A report by the Director of Housing outlining the cost of the publicity campaign undertaken 
following the meeting of the Council on the 3rd September was submitted to the Housing Committee 
for its meeting on the 24th November. The total spend was £7,800: £3,570 on four insertions in the 
'Telegraph, Star and Star Weekly'; £1,730 on the printing and distributing of leaflets, posters and 
letters; £500 on the production of designs, finished artwork and photography; and £2,000 on obtaining 
legal advice.75 The report requested the Housing Committee to approve the incurring of this 
expenditure, authorise payment, and seek approval of the Budget Sub-Committee for a supplementary 
vote of £7,800 to cover the costs.76 The Committee agreed to ask 'the Policy Committee for a 
supplementary vote of £5,800 on Revenue Account in respect of the expenditure now reported.'77 
However, before the resolution was passed Cheetham and Smith put forward an amendment, rejected 
16 votes to 3, which stated 'that the Housing Committee deprecates the action of the Chairman in 
authorising the detailed expenditure now reported which was wasteful of resources, unnecessary and 
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ineffective.'78 Publicity campaigns surrounding the Right to Buy were not just undertaken by local 
authorities like Sheffield. Central government played an active role in advertising the rights that the 
Housing Act 1980 had introduced: 
In the financial year 1980-81 £530,000 was spent on advertisements on television and 
in national newspapers telling public sector tenants of their rights under Part 1 of the 
Housing Act 1980 (including the Tenant's Charter and the Right to Buy). A further 
£125,000 was spent later in the same financial year on newspaper advertisements to 
remind tenants of the need to serve Right to Buy claim forms by 5th April in order to 
qualify for an 8th August valuation. In the financial year 1981-82, £239,000 was spent 
on publicising the Right to Buy. Information given in response to a parliamentary 
answer in May 1985 showed that the £2.3 million spent on publicity to promote 
council house sales was the largest campaign since 1979.79 
On the 3rd December the issue of Council house rent increases again emerged in Sheffield. The DoE 
had suggested to Sheffield City Council that rents should rise by a sum in excess of £3 per week on 
average from the 1st April 1981 so that housing subsidies could be withdrawn in line with this. As 
mentioned earlier, it was only back in August that rents had gone up buy £1.98 per week. This further 
rent increase so soon after a previous increase was, in the Council's view, evidence that the Thatcher 
Government was trying to price tenants out of local authority housing, pushing them to exercise their 
Right to Buy. It was a very shrewd move; housing subsidy could be reduced as rents went up and 
central government housing expenditure as a whole could be reduced as more and more tenants 
exercised their Right to Buy, increasing owner-occupation. The meeting of the Council that took place 
on the 3rd December brought this suggested rent increase up as a Notice of Motion. Betts, supported by 
Labour councillor David Skinner, put forward a motion that the suggested rent increase, and the 
amount cut from housing subsidy, would result in 'discriminating against one section of the 
community, [and would] contrast starkly with the suggested 6 per cent pay limit for public sector 
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workers and directly contribute to increasing the rate of inflation'.80 Cheetham and Smith tried to 
amend the motion. They put forward that both the Council rent and Council rate increases should be in 
line with the 'falling rate of inflation' and 'the reduced levels of wage settlement already accepted by 
many private sector employees and now being proposed for public sector employees'.81 The 
amendment also stated that the Council believe that there was a need to 'balance equitably the interests 
of both rent payers and rate payers and the respective burdens carried by those groups' and that the 
Council 'suggests that local authorities should be asked to ensure that the percentage level of Council 
house rent increase should not be less than the percentage level of rate increase declared for the local 
authority area'.82 This move to make sure that Sheffield City Council considered the needs of all of its 
rate payers rather than focusing of those of its tenants was rejected 55 votes to 16 with 1 abstention. 
The original motion was passed 54 votes to 17 with 1 abstention.83 
At the next meeting of the Council on the 7th January 1981 Cheetham put some questions to Betts 
concerning the Right to Buy in Sheffield. He was asked how many RTB 1 forms (the form outlining 
the tenant's wish to buy) had been received, to which his answer was 2,831. For the RTB 2 forms (the 
response to the tenant's wish to buy) Betts stated that 2,442 had been issued to tenants with 2,363 
acknowledging the Right to Buy. It was clear that some of the Council tenants of Sheffield were 
exercising their Right to Buy. The most significant answer to Cheetham's questions concerned the 
number of valuations that had been carried out in connection with Council house sales. The answer 
was none.84 This was because the Council was still waiting on the report, mentioned at the meeting of 
the Housing Committee on the 20th October 1980, outlining the staffing implications of the Housing 
Act 1980. Although at the meetings of the Council on the 7th January and the 4th February attempts 
were made to alter the position of the Council these were unsuccessful, and the report on the staffing 
implications of the Act remained the main method of obstructing the Right to Buy in Sheffield. 
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The obstruction of Right to Buy applications by Sheffield City Council caught the attention of 
Heseltine and the DoE. On the 4th March John Stanley from the DoE outlined how many letters of 
complaint the Department had received from tenants about delays in Right to Buy applications: 
The Department has received approximately 2,000 letters from tenants complaining 
about delay in a small minority of local authorities. Each of these individual 
complaints is being pursued by the Department with the authority concerned. In 
addition, the Department has now taken up formally with the following 16 authorities 
their rate of progress in implementing the right to buy. The authorities are Bolsover, 
Bristol, Doncaster, Great Yarmouth, Hull, Leeds, Manchester, Sheffield, Stoke-on-
Trent, Sunderland, Wolverhampton and the London boroughs of Barking and 
Dagenham, Camden, Greenwich, Lambeth and Newham.85 
This was the first of a number of speeches made by Stanley concerning the Right to Buy and Section 
23. On the 1st April Conservative MP David Knox asked Stanley whether the Secretary of State would 
consider amending the Housing Act 1980 to specify a maximum length of time between which a Right 
to Buy application was made and the sale completed. Stanley replied that this had been considered by 
the DoE, but it was decided that it would not be in the best interests of local authority tenants. Instead, 
it was seen to be 'preferable to rest ultimately on the Secretary of State's powers to intervene'.86 When 
asked whether he was concerned about the length of time certain local authorities were taking to 
complete sales, Stanley made the position of the DoE clear: 
I assure my hon. Friend that we share his concern about the rate of progress of certain 
authorities. I am glad to repeat what I said last Saturday to those authorities which are 
delaying and spinning out the sale of council houses. I said that if they will not sell, 
we will and that we would start the process soon.87 
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On the 15th April Stanley announced that seven local authorities would be receiving letters informing 
them that the Secretary of State was contemplating intervention under Section 23. These seven 
authorities had already had correspondence with the DoE regarding their Right to Buy progress which, 
according to Stanley, had revealed that the progress was 'so unsatisfactory that intervention under 
Section 23 would be justified.'88 Sheffield was one of the seven. They were given 28 days to show that 
satisfactory progress had been made in terms of valuations and sales. If by the 13th May the 
information submitted did not satisfy the Secretary of State then intervention under Section 23 would 
occur. The information requested concerned the following: the number of RTB 1 forms received; the 
number of RTB 2 forms issued by the Council; the number of cases where instructions had been given 
to undertake valuations; the number of valuations completed; the number of notices under Section 10 
that had been issued by the Council; the number of sales completed; the date by which all Section 10 
offer notices will have been submitted to those with Right to Buy claims that have been accepted by 
the Council; and the date by which all sales of accepted Right to Buy claims will have been 
completed.89 It was no surprise that Sheffield was one of the first local authorities to be subjected to 
this sort of scrutiny. The Morning Telegraph had reported as early as the 3rd October 1980 that 
Sheffield was already under close observation by the DoE and that a deadline for the first lot of sales 
had been selected: 
It is understood the date has been fixed for early next year and a civil servant in the 
Department of the Environment has already been earmarked for the job of selling off 
Sheffield's municipal housing stock if the City Council refuses to allow sales to go 
ahead.90 
The Chief Executive of Sheffield City Council submitted the requested information to the DoE on the 
12th May, reporting that 3,914 Right to Buy applications had been received and 3,784 RTB 2 forms 
had been issued (3,668 accepting the Right to Buy and 116 denying it). In all cases the response from 
the Council had been within the 28 day limit outlined in the Act: 612 valuations had commenced and 
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278 had been completed. The total value of the 278 completed valuations was in excess of £3 million. 
In addition, 145 Section 10 notices, informing the applicant of the value of their dwelling, had been 
issued. The Council had still not registered any sales of Council dwellings and could not give an exact 
date for the submission of Section 10 notices and for the completion of all outstanding Right to Buy 
sales. The Chief Executive claimed that 'all possible steps have been taken to expedite the necessary 
procedures.'91  
The staffing implications involved with the Act which had been the Council's main method of 
obstructing the Right to Buy was finally addressed on the 10th April. It was decided that two posts of 
'Housing Information Assistant', each with a salary between £6057-£6651, would be appointed to 
advise tenants wishing to buy their Council dwellings of the responsibilities of home ownership, such 
as the likely cost of mortgage repayments and the cost of property insurance. On the 28th April the 
Policy Committee had approved the action taken by Betts in nominating six members of the Housing 
Committee to form a Valuation Panel which was formally approved at a special meeting of Committee 
on the 6th May. The Council's ability to fight against the Right to Buy was deteriorating. It is at this 
point when 'obstruction' gave way to 'compliance'. 
On the same day that the Chief Executive had submitted the requested information to the DoE, Betts 
had sent a letter to Gerald Kaufman, the Shadow Environment Secretary, enclosing the 
correspondence that had taken place between the Council and the DoE. His letter outlined three 
arguments against intervention under Section 23. Firstly, it was argued that by the 13th May the 
Council had performed as much work on implementing the Right to Buy as many other local 
authorities that had not been referenced by John Stanley on the 15th April. West Derbyshire, a 
Conservative-controlled local authority, had also registered no sales by this point, and Betts saw this 
as party political bias because they had not received threats of intervention under Section 23. The 
second argument referred to the 28 day limit that the Council was given to improve the situation 
concerning the Right to Buy. The Council did not see how it was possible to do anymore to satisfy the 
Secretary of State in such a short space of time. The Council had, in their opinion, adopted a much 
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more pragmatic approach to the sale of Council dwellings compared to what had occurred up until 
May 1981. A valuation panel had been established and valuations were now taking place, the staffing 
implications of the Act had been rectified, and Section 10 notices were now being issued to tenants 
wishing to exercise the Right to Buy. Although the Council was not happy that these changes had 
taken place progress had been made. Betts made it clear that if the Secretary of State did decide to 
intervene he would have to explain 'why the progress made during the 28 days is not sufficient and 
what progress would have been sufficient.'92 Finally, in terms of the pace of the progress being made, 
Betts argued that any further pressure on Council staff to achieve satisfactory progress may have 
created 'a general industrial dispute'93 which would have hindered their progress. Betts had feared that 
an overworked Council workforce would have been prone to going on strike. 
The progress was deemed satisfactory by the DoE and the threat of intervention under Section 23 was 
subsequently withdrawn. By the 18th June Sheffield City Council had capital receipts from the sales of 
their dwellings of around £51,000. This was a small amount compared to Doncaster and Leeds, with 
totals of £319,000 and £411,000 respectively, but was larger than Rotherham's total of £12,000; 
Barnsley had still failed to register a single sale.94 Heseltine's threat of intervention against local 
authorities like Sheffield raised questions around the purpose of Section 23. As mentioned earlier, 
West Derbyshire had registered no sales but was not threatened with the use of Section 23. Gerald 
Kaufman, on behalf of the Council, had raised this issue with John Stanley on the 15th April. He had 
claimed that Sheffield had been included on 'his [Heseltine's] list of scapegoats'95, while Conservative-
controlled local authorities like the Greater London Council (GLC), Westminster and the City of 
London, who had lower numbers of acceptances than some of the seven Stanley had singled out, had 
not had any action threatened against them. Section 23 was a legislative tool to pressurise local 
authorities, largely Labour-controlled, which were seen as a thorn in the side of the Thatcher 
Government. More than anything it sent a powerful message to local authorities who were not 
implementing the Right to Buy in a manner that central government agreed with. Section 23 'provided 
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the basis for an unprecedented monitoring, scrutiny and intervention over how local authorities, which 
[were] not refusing to implement the Right to Buy, [organised] that implementation.'96 The problem 
was that 'the Government did not define in the Act or in any Circular precise interpretations or 
standards for implementation.'97 The Thatcher Government would simply ignore the opposition from 
local authorities towards the Right to Buy regardless of their concerns, even if they were rational 
concerns: 'The fact that Section 23 was in the legislation was an expression of determination that the 
Right to Buy should work.'98 
Conclusion 
From the very beginning, the Council had put up a defiant front against the Housing Act 1980 and the 
Right to Buy. When the Housing Committee first discussed the Bill on the 7th November 1979 they 
deplored the Right to Buy proposals and saw the new housing subsidy system as an attack on local 
democracy. As the Bill made its way through Parliament the Council's total opposition to the 
mandatory right to purchase local authority dwellings was made clear to the House of Commons. The 
Council would also clash with the Government when it came to its HIP allocation for 1980-81 which 
was significantly lower than the previous year. These early exchanges established Sheffield as a firm 
opponent to the Government's housing policy and together made up the phase of 'non-cooperation' 
that took place until the 8th August 1980. The Council then moved onto 'obstruction' once the Act 
became law. Leading figures like Betts knew that the Council could not hold out against the 
implementation of the Right to Buy forever, so they made concerted efforts to stall the process. The 
meeting of the Housing Committee on the 20th October 1980 saw the formulation of the key method 
in hampering the Right to Buy process. By waiting for a report by the Staffing Sub-Committee on the 
staffing implications of the Act the Council bought itself some time, and was until May 1981 effective 
in limiting the amount of Right to Buy sales that took place.  
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The other approach that the Council adopted during this 'obstruction' phase was the use of anti-
Government 'propaganda' to attack the Housing Act 1980, especially the Right to Buy. This 
'propaganda' created the impression that the Council would not allow the implementation of the Right 
to Buy to go ahead without strong resistance at the local level. The fact that the Council were also 
creating uncertainty for those wishing to exercise the Right to Buy reinforced this impression. 
Although the Council was obstructing the implementation of the Right to Buy it can hardly be 
described as strong resistance. On the surface, the Council appeared to be a powerful force in the 
conflict, however this was all part of the political theatre that they were engaged in. It was an attempt 
to present the illusion that moves were being taken that could actually pose real challenges to the 
Government. Betts knew that with the Right to Buy guaranteed by law there was nothing they could 
do at the local level to disrupt its implementation forever. Therefore, when the threat of intervention 
under Section 23 was made in May 1981 the Council capitulated. Perhaps the Council retreated in 
such a way so as to fight another day. 
May 1981 was the point at which the conflict around housing between the Thatcher Government and 
Sheffield City Council reached its peak. For a time 'non-cooperation' and 'obstruction' worked. As 
mentioned earlier, the Council was until May 1981 successful in stalling the sale of Council dwellings. 
It is harder to gauge the success of the publicity campaign that the Council orchestrated, but it 
nevertheless established Sheffield as a vocal opponent to the Right to Buy, regardless of whether or 
not the 'propaganda' deterred any tenants from wanting to purchase their homes. This investigation 
into how Sheffield fought against the Thatcher Government has shown how, in hindsight, the conflict 
as an unwinnable one for the Council. Although they were successful in stalling the Right to Buy the 
Council failed in its fight against the cuts to the HIP allocation and the increase in rents. Despite cries 
of protest from the Council and some Sheffield MPs concerning the HIP allocation, central 
government policy was followed. The same happened with rents. The attempts by the Council to stir 
up local discontent towards the Thatcher Government when it came to rent increases did nothing to 
stop them from rising. Obstructing the sale of Council dwellings was one of the few weapons the 
Council had left at its disposal and it was a weak one at that. May 1981 saw the move from 
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'obstruction' to 'compliance' in the face of intervention through Section 23 and was a major blow to 
Sheffield's opposition to the Housing Act 1980. Caving under the pressure of intervention under 
Section 23 was the only realistic option left. If the Council had held out Heseltine would have simply 
used his powers to appoint a civil servant from the DoE to make sure that the Right to Buy was 
implemented. Those within the Council who were responsible for stalling the sale of Council 
dwellings may have found themselves subject to legal action. If Betts had held out he still would not 
have stopped the Right to Buy but would have also had the possibility of surcharge and 
disqualification looming over him.  
It is clear in hindsight that the Council were delaying the inevitable; however the Labour councillors 
leading the fight against the Housing Act 1980 did not have the benefit of hindsight. To them the fight 
made sense because they believed that there was a chance that Labour could win a snap general 
election and reverse the changes that were being made. The resolution passed on the 20th December 
1980, calling on the Opposition to declare that it would allow local authorities to buy back Right to 
Buy dwellings, demonstrates this. Despite their opposition the HIP allocation would rise and fall 
throughout the 1980s but the general trend was that of a decrease. At 1989-90 prices the allocation for 
1980-81 was £36.016 million, dropping down to £24.8 million for 1989-90.99 This changed the focus 
of the Council when it came to housing. Housebuilding by the Council decreased rapidly. 1,277 
completions had occurred in 1980. In 1985 this had dropped down to 255 and in 1989 only 45 
completions had occurred.100 The focus was instead placed on the modernisation of the current stock 
and on slum clearance. For 1977-78 the renovation of the Council stock used 10.5 per cent of the 
capital programme but for 1988-89 this had risen to 84.8 per cent.101 Housebuilding was increasingly 
provided through different avenues. For example, in October 1986 the Council entered into a 
partnership with the United Kingdom Housing Trust (UKHT) to build 4,000 homes on land owned by 
the Council.102  
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Rents would continue to increase in Sheffield throughout the 1980s, as they did across England and 
Wales. The average rent per year in Sheffield for 1982-83 was £478, lower than the average for 
England and Wales at £702. The average rent for Sheffield reached £800 in 1985-86 and would 
continue to increase to £926 by 1988-89. The average across England and Wales was £810 and £974 
for 1985-86 and 1988-89 respectively.103 The increase in rents was needed to offset the reduction in 
central government subsidies for local authority housing. The Thatcher Government was determined 
to reduce the cost of local authority housing so the reduction of housing subsidy was a logical move 
for them. This could have made the Right to Buy more appealing to Council tenants as rents continued 
to increase.  
Between April 1981 and December 1989 Sheffield City Council registered 13,696 Right to Buy sales, 
14.4 per cent of the 95,293 Council dwellings on the 1st April 1981.104 This was lower than the 
national average, and in some ways can be seen as a minor "victory" for the Council. The lower take 
up of the Right to Buy in Sheffield was hardly surprising given the economic circumstances. In the 
South-west region between 1979-80 and 1985-86 622,052 Right to Buy sales were completed, 
whereas in Yorkshire and Humbershire, hit hard by central government economic policy, only 64,517 
were completed in the same period.105 Those dwellings that were purchased in Sheffield through the 
Right to Buy were part of the more desirable stock of housing (three-bedroom, semi-detached houses 
in suburban locations) which was also the trend throughout England and Wales. By February 1984 
3,508 Right to Buy sales had been completed with only 21 of these beings flats.106 This had an effect 
on the type of stock available to those needing to rent from the Council.  Fewer new tenants were 
housed and there was an increase in the waiting time for a Council dwelling.107   
Whether the lower Right to Buy sales figures throughout the 1980s show a "victory" for the Council is 
dubious. The 14.4% sales rate was not necessarily due to Council policy but more likely was the result 
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of the dire economic situation in Sheffield.  As mentioned earlier, Section 23 was in the legislation to 
show that the Right to Buy would work regardless of the opposition to it. The Council were in a better 
position than central government to gauge the housing situation in Sheffield. The Council's opposition 
was on the one hand fuelled by the stark ideological differences between them and the Thatcher 
Government. However, it was also fuelled by the perceived threat that was posed to the people of 
Sheffield when it came to housing. Privately it may have possibly been fuelled by the perceived threat 
to the influence the Council had over its people through the provision of housing. The Right to buy 
was exercised by those in a better financial situation and when it was exercised it saw the more 
desirable stock taken out of public control. An increasing number of Council tenants were left with 
lower quality housing, in receipt of housing benefit to cover the rent, with no realistic means of 
exercising the Right to Buy. This was by no means a "victory" for the Council. Despite this the 
Thatcher Government was insistent that the Right to Buy was good for local authority tenants and they 
would use Section 23 if necessary to prove it. All the councils opposed to the Right to Buy capitulated 
in the face of intervention under Section 23.  
The conflict between the Thatcher Government and Sheffield City Council around housing fits into the 
general theme of a power struggle between two opposing political ideologies. Labour had been 
dominant in Sheffield since the 1930s. The assets that they had built up in that time in terms of 
housing were considerable. The Council's housing initiatives had used up a vast amount of time, 
manpower and money, and had gained both national and international acclaim. The fact that the 
Government was encroaching on this automatically put leading Labour figures in Sheffield on the 
defensive. The housing stock was also a political asset to help maintain the support of the Council's 
base, the working class of Sheffield. The patronage which came with housing, as seen with the 
treatment of Right to Buy tenants as second-class tenants, was a powerful tool for keeping voters on 
the side of the Council. The Thatcher Government posed a threat to all of this. It was already 
becoming clear in the 1970s that owning a home was for most people a 'basic and natural desire'. The 
Council did not see it this way, rather they had invested in the social infrastructure, providing for 
people of Sheffield for decades, and it was this that had helped solidify their political dominance of the 
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city. The Right to Buy exposed the cracks in this belief. The take up of the Right to Buy in Sheffield, 
although lower than the average across England and Wales, showed that there was an appetite for 
home-ownership. Giving people the Right to Buy was a way for the Thatcher Government to win over 
the more affluent and aspirational working-class Labour voters in Sheffield. The Right to Buy split the 
working class in Sheffield and those who exercised it were seen by the Council as traitors, the 'basket 
of deplorables'108 of the 1980s, hence their treatment of any ex-tenants or those still in the process of 
purchasing their Council-owned property. These ex-tenants had bought Council dwellings at well 
below market value 'which had been created by the investment of tenants, ratepayers and taxpayers in 
collective housing over the years'.109 
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Chapter Two: 
The Fight Against Local Government Finance 
Reform 
 
Introduction 
A battle between Sheffield City Council and the Thatcher Government over local government finance 
reform took place alongside the conflict over local authority housing, continuing long after that 
conflict had begun to subside. The fight over local government finance reform between Sheffield City 
Council and the Thatcher Government is the focus of this chapter. There were three pieces of 
legislation that the Government pushed through Parliament which formed the backbone of central-
local government conflict: the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, the Local 
Government Finance Act 1982 and the Rates Act 1984. It is worth briefly outlining each piece of 
legislation because their implementation and the conflict that followed provide the framework for this 
chapter. The financial relationship between central and local government lies at the heart of this 
chapter hence only the key parts of each piece of legislation which had an effect on this relationship 
will be highlighted. 
The Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 was one of Heseltine's first legislative attempts 
at curbing local authority spending. The title of the Act suggests, as stated by Charles Arnold-Baker, 
that although 'it may have an underlying political purpose, it is not, in a drafting sense, an organic 
whole.'1 The complicated nature of the Act meant that the first Bill was abandoned by the Government 
towards the end of 1979 and a second heavily amended Bill began its journey through Parliament on 
the 24th January 1980. The cumbersome Act 'was the product of naive enthusiasm of an ambitious but 
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inexperienced Secretary of State.'2 Given Royal Assent on the 13th November 1980 it changed local 
government finance by combining the needs and resources elements of the Rate Support Grant (RSG) 
into a system of block grants. The Act introduced a system to penalise local authorities by reducing 
grant for those who overspent above a threshold calculated by central government. The DoE now also 
had the power to set limits on capital spending rather than just borrowing. 
The Local Government Finance Act 1982 was an attempt to shore up the shortcomings of the 1980 
Act. The Act, given Royal Assent on the 13th July 1982, legalised the further system of targets and 
penalties introduced by Heseltine and the DoE in 1981-82. The ability of local authorities to raise 
supplementary rates was abolished with the passing of the Act. The original Bill had suggested that a 
local referendum should be held if a local authority wanted to raise a supplementary rate but 
opposition from Conservative back-bench Members of Parliament and others saw the Bill dropped.3 It 
seems that Heseltine viewed abolishing the right to raise a supplementary rate as a way of making the 
whole legislative process smoother. Finally, the Act saw the creation of the Audit Commission who 
would 'oversee the auditing of local authority finances and encourage "value for money" from local 
spending.'4 The Commission was self-funded, and independent of central government, which meant 
that it was not established to be a mouthpiece of the DoE. The creation of the Audit Commission was 
seen by the Thatcher Government as justified, given the continuing high levels of local government 
spending. However, critics have argued that because the main priority of the Audit Commission was 
to find avenues through which local authorities could become more efficient, its reports appeared to 
portray the achievements and performance of local authorities in a disproportionately negative light.5 
The fact that the abolition of the Commission in March 2015 'was not regarded as contentious'6 shows 
that as the years went by it had lost favour with central government. A new local audit framework 
came into effect from the 1st April 2015. 
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Although these two pieces of legislation had made sizeable changes to local government finance they 
did not fulfil everything that the Thatcher Government had set out to do. Despite dogged attempts 
from the Government, local authority expenditure was not coming down at a satisfactory pace. This 
was mainly because high spending councils were raising the rates to bridge the spending gap caused 
by the reduction of central government funding. The Rates Act 1984 was introduced to address this. It 
was given Royal Assent on the 26th June 1984 and allowed the Government to set limits on the 
increases to the rates that local authorities could levy. The Act was greeted with uproar from high 
spending, largely Labour, local authorities. Even a few senior figures in the Conservative Party during 
the drafting phase of the Bill saw rate capping as a potentially 'unconstitutional constraint on what 
was an ancient privilege of local government.'7 
This chapter will explore in detail the approach Sheffield City Council adopted to fight against the 
cuts to local government finance. Stewart Lansley, Sue Goss and Christian Wolmer comment on the 
collapse of the Left within local authorities in opposing the Thatcher Government and local 
government finance reform in Councils in Conflict. For them the collapse of the Left was due to a lack 
of unity between the local authorities that were opposed to the changes being implemented. Councils 
like Ted Knight's Lambeth and 'Militant Liverpool' were in favour of flatly opposing the changes 
made to local government finance and testing the resolve of the Government in ensuring that these 
changes were fully implemented. They were even willing to venture into illegality and risk personal 
surcharge and disqualification from public office. However, Lansley et al. argue that Blunkett's 
approach was softer and more pragmatic. Blunkett was not in favour of illegality and instead wanted 
to play by the rules (to a certain degree) despite his strong left-wing credentials. Although the blame 
for the collapse of the Left's opposition is not placed solely at Blunkett's door, Lansley et al. use this 
example to illustrate how splits like these were crucial in their defeat.8 It is unclear whether unity on 
an agenda would have been successful in reversing the trend within local government finance. 
Obviously the local authorities did not have the power to enact changes to laws passed in Parliament 
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but perhaps a more united local authority opposition with a clear agenda would have been able to 
place more effective pressure on the Government. 
While using the Councils in Conflict argument as a theme for this chapter, the findings provide greater 
insight through the use of archival sources, into how exactly Blunkett's approach was formulated and 
then implemented. What has been interesting in conducting the research is that while the sources used 
prove Lansley et al. to be correct they have also shown that Blunkett's approach had a lot in common 
with Hilary Clinton's claim to having 'both a public and a private position', which came out during the 
2016 US presidential election.9 Blunkett was against the cuts that were being made to local 
government finance, that much is clear, but his opposition appears to have two different sides. On the 
one hand, the Council were very vocal in their opposition to the cuts and their determination to defend 
local services in Sheffield to meet the needs of its people. A lot of Council money was poured into the 
production of 'propaganda' to help communicate this message. On the other hand, however, Blunkett 
was instrumental in ensuring that the Council and its various committees made savings to improve 
efficiency. Furthermore, despite the theatrics of the Council meetings during the final months of the 
battle over rate capping, Blunkett was actually in favour of setting a rate and drawing up a deficit 
budget when faced with the prospect of being rate capped. This view would have seen the Council set 
a rate in line with the maximum prescribed rate under the Rates Act 1984 but also set out a budget 
planning to spend more than the Council's income could provide for. The challenge for Blunkett was 
trying to balance being a national figurehead for the anti-Thatcher movement while keeping the day-
to-day workings of a local authority, under increasing central government scrutiny, in order. 
The analysis of the conflict has been divided into three sections. The first section analyses the conflict 
between June 1979 and July 1982. This initial part can be seen as the drawing of the battle lines. It 
became clear to the Council how the Government would attack them financially and as a response 
Blunkett and the Council began to formulate how they would defend their position in Sheffield. It is 
                                                     
9
 B. Wolfgang, 'Clinton Says She Has "Both a Public and a Private Position" on Wall Street: WikiLeaks 
Release', The Washington Times, 8th October 2016 [Online], Available at: 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/8/hillary-clinton-says-she-has-both-public-and-priva/ 
[Accessed: 20/07/2017]. 
46 
 
not all out war at this point but the tensions are certainly heightened. The second section of the 
conflict, July 1982 to June 1984, sees the Council fight back. There is a clear change in the approach 
of the Council in tackling central government policy as more emphasis is placed on the increased 
production of 'propaganda' and a move towards challenging the Government through the judicial 
process is taken. Although Blunkett keeps the need to make savings as a significant priority it is a 
much more hostile Council that emerges during this period. Finally, June 1984 to May 1985 sees the 
rapid retreat of the Council. The Council continues to fight against the possibility of rate capping well 
into 1985 and the Labour Group remains united in this fight. However, the risk of venturing into 
illegality by not setting a legal rate rapidly sees division emerge within the Labour Group at the 
meeting of the Council on the 7th May. There are no signs of this division in the months preceding the 
meeting. The 7th May was the point at which many within the Labour Group saw that the war was lost 
and that the only course of action left was for the Council to surrender. 
Local Government Finance 1945-79 
The end of the Second World War saw the beginning of an expansion of local government that would 
continue largely unchallenged into the 1970s. The ideals of the post-war consensus, with its build-up 
of the welfare state and an increasing reliance on both central and local government as a provider of 
services, facilitated this growth. This transformation occurred under the watch of both Labour and 
Conservative governments. A young Margaret Thatcher wrote in October 1949 that 'local government 
has been one of the most valuable features of our national life: it has enabled town and country to be 
administered by men on the spot, in daily contact with local conditions.'10 Even the Heath 
Government, with its initial commitment to frugal government spending, published a White Paper in 
1971 calling for a reorganisation of local government so that it could 'take action without being 
subjected to excessive regulation by central government through financial or other controls.'11 
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It was this unprecedented growth in local government, as argued by Gerry Stoker, which formed the 
origins of the struggle over local authority expenditure that took place during the Thatcher era.12 Local 
authority expenditure as a share of gross national product rose from 9.8 per cent in 1951 to 18.6 per 
cent in 1975.13 The share of central government grants to local authority income for current 
expenditure was 35 per cent in 1954 whereas by 1975 it had increased to 45 per cent, while during the 
same period the contribution of the rates was declining.14 Central and local government developed a 
close relationship using local authority associations to discuss legislative changes and even minor 
alterations to the day-to-day activities of local government.15 This relationship was described in 1986 
by Roderick Rhodes as a 'corporate relationship'.16 It is worth noting that although local government 
spending was increasing this was taking place during a time of increasing central government 
spending overall. Research by the Institute for Fiscal Studies shows that government spending as a 
percentage of gross national product increased from 39.5 per cent to 48.6 per cent between 1951 and 
1975.17  
This seemingly blissful period in central-local government relations was not without its difficulties. 
The powers of local authorities were changed by the Attlee Government in 1945 and the 
reorganisation that took place under the Local Government Act 1972 (the result of a Royal 
Commission set up by the Wilson Government) showed that central government was not completely 
opposed to meddling in the workings of local government. However, the real change to this 
relationship took place during the Wilson and Callaghan Administrations. A DoE Circular in 
December 1974 stated that central government should play a role in offering guidance to local 
authorities in how savings and overall efficiency could be achieved. The financial relationship 
between central and local government was beginning to change, with the role of central government 
as a provider of large sums of money now taking on the additional responsibility as an advisor into 
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how that money should be spent. In 1975 Denis Healey announced the creation of the Consultative 
Council for Local Government Finance, which would act as a channel of communication between 
central government, local authorities and all of the local government representative bodies.18 
Using this 'strategy of incorporation'19, RSG as a share of local government expenditure fell from 66.5 
per cent in 1975-76 to 61 per cent in 1978-79.20 Sheffield City Council's share of expenditure met by 
RSG fell from 59.9 per cent in 1975-76 to 56.7 per cent in 1978-79, while the contribution from the 
rates increased from 40.1 per cent to 43.3 per cent during the same period.21 The need to reduce local 
government expenditure was heightened following the IMF Crisis of 1976. October of that year saw 
Anthony Crosland announce to local authorities that 'the party's over' during a meeting at the 
Manchester Free Trade Hall.22 This process was fairly smooth as an increasing number of local 
authorities came under Conservative control - a reflection of the unpopularity of the Labour 
government - who were committed to controlling public spending; the remaining Labour-controlled 
local authorities would largely toe the line due to party loyalty.23 
A conversation about rate reform was also ongoing during the mid-1970s. A Labour departmental 
enquiry, set up in 1974 under the chairmanship of Sir Frank Layfield, reported in May 1976 that the 
rates should be in place for industrial premises and a local income tax for households.24 However, the 
report also stated that the rates were a cheap and efficient form of local tax.25 Essentially the main 
thrust of the argument contained in the report was 'that a choice had to be made between a system of 
local government finance based on local responsibility, and hence local accountability, for local 
government expenditure, and one based on central responsibility.'26 Much like with the non-
implementation of the Right to Buy, the Callaghan Administration did not act upon the 
recommendations made in the Layfield Report. Sheffield City Council were in favour of the 
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recommendations surrounding reform of the rates.27 Historians and political scientists can only 
speculate on whether events might have unfolded in a different, more harmonious manner, throughout 
the Thatcher era if the changes had been made. 
While in opposition Thatcher's Conservative Party was not committed to waging a war over finance 
against local government, and there was nothing in their 1979 general election manifesto that 
appeared to foreshadow the conflict soon to follow. Labour had been reasonably successful in 
reducing the amount of money central government was giving to local authorities. It was not the 
Thatcher Government's aims for financial reform that would be the catalyst for the conflict to come. 
Instead it was the uncompromising approach that it adopted to achieve them that would provoke local 
authorities like Sheffield, Lambeth and Liverpool. Labour's period of consultation, the corporate 
relationship and friendly cooperation would be replaced by increasing hostility, mistrust and a desire 
to emasculate local government, especially those local authorities under the control of the Labour 
Party. Of course this view does not take away from the fact that Callaghan's Labour Party and 
Thatcher's Conservative Party were situated on very different ends of the political spectrum. The fact 
that a Labour government was being replaced by a Conservative one under Thatcher guaranteed the 
shaking up of the status quo and the creation of a degree of conflict between central government and 
local authorities, chiefly those which were Labour-controlled. 
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Local Government Finance Reform and Sheffield City Council, June 1979 to 
May 1985 
June 1979 to July 1982: The battle lines are drawn 
On the 12th June 1979 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, set the tone for what was in 
store for local government in the coming years. Turning to public expenditure during his budget 
announcement he stated that 'the need for substantial economies applies equally to local expenditure, 
where the Government's contribution is made through the Rate Support Grant.' A reduction of £300 
million for England and Wales and £35 million for Scotland was what the Government intended, set 
against the total of RSG expenditure of around £9 billion. This reduction was largely influenced by 
the idea of 'how much in present circumstances it is reasonable for the taxpayer to contribute.'28 This 
view signified a crucial change in policy. It was now being suggested that the main priority for the 
management of local services should be on how much local taxpayers were willing to pay for them. 
Crosland had announced the end of the party; Howe was announcing the beginning of the hangover. 
In Sheffield, the Policy Committee's Budget Sub-Committee considered Howe's statement on the 19th 
June. A report compiled by the City Treasury outlined the implications for local government as a 
whole and the unique implications for Sheffield. A reduction of 3 per cent in the current expenditure 
of local authorities was being asked for by central government, 'broadly equivalent to the cut in Rate 
Support Grant.' Due to planned overspending for the financial year 1979-80 it was estimated by the 
City Treasurer that for Sheffield 'no additional needs grant will be received […] and there will be a 
"clawback" of resources grant amounting to £1.3 million.'29 The attack on the ability of the city to 
finance local services was underway. It is worth noting that the Council were carrying forward a 
surplus in the General Rate Fund of just over £20 million from 1978-79.30 Asking for savings when 
carrying forward a sizeable surplus from the following year was not what the Council found 
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offensive, rather it was the fact that central government was attempting to dictate how they managed 
their finances overall. 
The Policy Committee received a Joint Circular providing further information on the Government's 
intentions for RSG and local authority current expenditure for 1979-80. At a meeting of the 
Committee on the 4th July they formulated the Council's approach to local government finance reform. 
The approach would remain largely unchanged throughout the conflict that is the subject of this 
chapter. It was decided that the Council would 'do its utmost to defend the fabric of local authority 
services in Sheffield against the Conservative Government's vicious spending cuts'. Furthermore, the 
Council would 'take the lead in organising local authority opposition to these unrealistic and divisive 
policies of the Government.' What is interesting about the response, especially as it is a common 
theme in Sheffield's fight against the Thatcher Government, was that the Committee endorsed the 
decision of the Chairman 'in instituting a further intensive review of Council spending'.31 Despite the 
tough rhetoric, establishing the Council as a vocal opponent to the local government cuts and 
suggesting that it would use any option available to stop them from taking place, they still decided to 
review spending in the hope of making savings. This was interpreted as a move by the Council to 
demonstrate that savings could not be made. By conducting an intensive review of Council spending 
they could turn around and argue that there were no avenues available through which to make savings 
without crippling Council services. However, it would become clear later that this was not the case, as 
savings would in fact be made. This is one of the first examples of the Council refusing to take a 
definitive stand against central government policy. It gave the impression of saying one thing and 
doing the opposite. The problem with day-to-day politics is that it cannot work solely on ideological 
grounds; pragmatism is required for the system to function. 
At the meeting of the Council of the same day two Conservative councillors, David Heslop and Pat 
Santhouse, tried to amend the minutes of the Policy Committee. Their amendment stated that the 
Council 'appreciates that savings must be made in public expenditure and requests the Chief Officers 
to take positive action […] on ways of achieving departmental savings'. Additionally, the Council 
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'regrets the recent statements grossly misrepresenting and distorting the size and extent of the alleged 
Government cutbacks.'32 This amendment was rejected 58 votes to 17 with 1 abstaining. David 
Chadwick and Geoffrey Griffiths, two Liberal councillors, tried to amend the minutes by adding to the 
original statement that the Council should 'write to the Sheffield Members of Parliament informing 
them of the City Council's concern at the reduction of the Rate Support Grant'.33 This amendment was 
also rejected. It is possible that this amendment was rejected because the Labour Group did not want 
to appear as if they were not taking the lead on formulating the Council's opposition. It is, however, 
more likely that this amendment was rejected because the Labour Group did not want to draw the 
attention of Parliament as an unwavering opposition force against the local government cuts when 
they were in fact in the process of making savings in line with what central government desired. 
In November 1979 Heseltine made a statement in the House of Commons in regard to the RSG 
settlement for 1980-81 and laid the initial guidelines for the new grant arrangements that would be 
introduced in the Local Government, Planning and Land Bill. The £300 million reduction previously 
announced had been increased to £310 million, and a major factor in this decision was 'the need to 
secure […] improvements in efficiency and productivity'. The thought process had again been 
influenced by how much the taxpayer should contribute given the current economic situation.34 In 
terms of the new grant arrangements Heseltine argued that it was 'clearly wrong that the Government's 
contribution through the Rate Support Grant to local authority expenditure can take no account of 
whether that expenditure is reasonable or not.'35 Heseltine continued, saying that 'such is the 
perversity of the present resources element arrangement that high spending authorities get the same 
level of support on all additions to expenditure, at the expense of other authorities.'36 
After a tumultuous time with the original Bill, a second Bill was introduced to Parliament on the 24th 
January 1980 and had its second reading on the 5th February. The Policy Committee had already had 
several discussions about the original Bill. They had given authority for the Chairman and the Chief 
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Executive to ensure that the views of the Council were heard in Parliament and had urged the 
Government to 'allow a reasonable period for full consultation with local authorities following the 
publishing of the Bill'.37 In addition, the Committee had decided that the Council should request the 
Sheffield Members of Parliament 'to give their full support to the united opposition of the local 
authorities' associations to the Government's proposals for the introduction of a block grant'.38 The 
Council were strongly opposed to the Bill because, as pointed out by Butcher et al., it created a shift 
which saw the needs element of the RSG become part of a package to be decided at the centre.39 This 
part of the Bill was just one example among many others of the increasing centralisation of local 
government finance that occurred during the Thatcher era. It is ironic that Thatcher, as a minimal 
government advocate, would preside over a drastic centralisation of decision making when it came to 
local government finance. 
The Local Government, Planning and Land (No. 2) Bill was of course part of the Conservative desire 
to reduce public expenditure. This desire was becoming clearer to observers as time went by. A 
statement by Howe on the 26th March 1980 outlined, among other things, the publication of the new 
White Paper (Cmnd. 7841) - 'The Government's Expenditure Plans 1980-81 to 1983-84' - which was 
summarised in a report by the City Treasurer on the 9th April. Outside of housing, local authority 
current expenditure would fall by 3.6 per cent in 1980-81, by about 2 per cent in 1981-82, and in 
1982-83 and 1983-84 by a further 1 per cent. In terms of capital expenditure, again outside of 
housing, it would decrease by 3.3 per cent in 1980-81, by about 5 per cent in 1981-82, 6 per cent in 
1982-83 and 3 per cent in 1983-84. According to the City Treasurer this meant that the Council's 
latest approved capital expenditure of £9.2 million, outside of housing, for 1979-80 would decrease to 
£7.7 million by 1983-84 'on the assumptions made in the White Paper'.40 
The war of words would continue to escalate. On the 18th September 1980 Heseltine announced that 
the DoE had analysed 444 of the 457 local authority budgets and these were £350 million (2.6 per 
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cent) above the target set for 1980-81.41 As a response to this planned overspending Heseltine 
proposed to withhold £200 million of RSG when he made the first Increase Order for 1980-81 in 
November. Sheffield's revised budget was 1.9 per cent above their individual target, resulting in a 
planned grant reduction of £1.02 million.42 Lambeth was to be subject to a £2.1 million reduction 
while Camden had a staggering £5.22 million reduction held over it.43 The Policy Committee 
considered Heseltine's statement on the 23rd September. It was decided, 15 votes to 2 with 1 
abstaining, that the City Council would call upon the Association of Metropolitan Authorities 'to raise 
in the strongest possible terms' the following issues with the DoE: 'the unfair and premature claw-
back of grant under the Rate Support Grant Increase Order on all local authorities'; 'the arbitrary and 
malicious selection of individual authorities subject to special penalties'; 'the constitutional and legal 
implications of such penalties'; and 'the threat to the democratic freedom of locally elected 
representatives to respond to the needs and wishes of their community and the possible consequences 
for the political and social framework of this country.' Furthermore, authority was given for the Chief 
Executive and the City Treasurer to start a dialogue with the DoE to raise 'the injustice of the unfair 
treatment of Sheffield'.44 
The 'clawback' proposal by Heseltine would be enacted if the Local Government, Planning and Land 
(No. 2) Bill became law. With the chances of this happening becoming increasingly likely the 
opposing local authorities needed a plan of action. The London Borough of Camden had sent a letter 
to Sheffield City Council 'on the possibility of certain local authorities taking steps to test the legality 
of the proposed action by the Secretary of State for the Environment'. On the 21st October the Policy 
Committee gave authority to the Chairman to inform Camden that the Council 'would be prepared to 
support such steps by the local authorities concerned.'45 What is significant is that negotiations 
between the Council and the DoE about the £1.02 million grant reduction, which had commenced 
following the decision of the Policy Committee on the 23rd September, were still ongoing. The 
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Council's original arguments were rejected by the Department but at a meeting of the Budget Sub-
Committee authority was given for the negotiations to continue.46 
Even though the Council gave the impression that they were willing to test the legality of Heseltine's 
proposed withholding of RSG, an agreement was reached with the DoE. It was unlikely that is was the 
Government who buckled under the pressure. Despite the front that they had put up, appearing as an 
ally of Camden in testing the legality of Heseltine's actions, they appeared to be pushing for a deal. 
Following further negotiations it was decided that the Council would not suffer the £1.02 million 
reduction in grant because of savings that would be made in the current financial year. £1,037,000 
was to be saved through the 'cancellation of contributions to the Council's Renewal and Repairs Fund 
in the current financial year', £700,000 was to be saved by giving full responsibility to South 
Yorkshire County Council for grants paid to pensioners formerly employed in services now 
undertaken by the County Council, and a further £200,000 saving was planned through an increase of 
£200,000 in 'the Markets Undertaking's contribution to the General Rate Fund during the current 
financial year'.47 This was another example of a pragmatic approach being given priority over 
ideology. The Council wanted to hold on to any available central government funding and so a deal 
had to be made. However, the Council had been given a boost in its opposition to the Thatcher 
Government. They had received a petition containing 282 signatures of staff and students at Sheffield 
City Polytechnic which expressed 'support of the Council's opposition to the Government's proposed 
cuts in public expenditure.'48 
This agreement may give the impression that tensions between the Thatcher Government and 
Sheffield City Council would be eased but this is far from the truth. In January 1981 Heseltine again 
changed the local authority expenditure target figure, this time putting it at 5.6 per cent below the 
actual out-turn for 1978-79. On the 27th January the Policy Committee decided that Heseltine should 
'be informed of the Council's grave concern at the constant changes by the Government of its 
formulae and agreed policies in respect of local government finance, which changes have aggravated 
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the difficult problems facing local authorities.'49 This target was significant as the Local Government, 
Planning and Land Act 1980, given Royal Assent on the 13th November 1980, meant that central 
government could now control both local authority current expenditure as well as capital expenditure. 
On the 14th April the effects of the Act in regards to current expenditure, capital expenditure and 
central government grant were reviewed by the Budget Sub-Committee. A report of the 8th April by 
the City Treasurer outlined the likely effects on the Council's finances. Block grant claims based on 
estimated expenditure for 1981-82 had been received by the DoE from the local authorities. The total 
of these claims exceeded the amount available by £300 million. This meant that in terms of 'clawback' 
Sheffield's share meant a £3.4 million reduction in grant.50 The £200 million reduction in RSG 
proposed by Heseltine on the 18th September 1980 had been made legal with the passing of the Act 
and was now known as 'holdback'. This was the method that was now to be used for controlling local 
authority current expenditure. Indications at the time suggested that local authority current 
expenditure for 1981-82 would exceed Government guidelines by up to £1.2 billion.51 Sheffield's 
current expenditure in the 1981-82 budget amounted to £155.146 million which exceeded their target 
(5.6 per cent below actual out-turn for 1978-79) by 10.6 per cent. Sheffield would, according to the 
City Treasurer, 'suffer a significant penalty if the Secretary of State decides to holdback block grant', 
and 'the total loss of grant in 1981-82 could be well in excess of the provision of £3 million'.52 In a 
statement to the Consultative Council on Local Government Finance on the 2nd June, Heseltine again 
called for 'all local authorities in England [...] to review and revise their budgets for 1981-82, with a 
view to bringing the total of local authority expenditure into line with the Government's expenditure 
plans.'53 More than a third of local authorities had ensured that they had revised their budgets to fit 
within Government targets and Heseltine hoped that many more would 'now put themselves in the 
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same position.'54 The Policy Committee deplored this 'further unwarranted attack by the Conservative 
Government on this Council and other democratically elected authorities'.55 
Heseltine's statement appears to have fallen on deaf ears. For example, a report by the City Treasurer 
dated the 17th September stated that although 'over half of local authorities have reduced their 
expenditure plans in line with the Government's request in June', the remainder had in fact increased 
their expenditure plans. This meant that local authority expenditure would still exceed the 
Government's target by 5.3 per cent. Heseltine therefore proposed to ask Parliament to reduce the 
block grant by £310 million, £140 million less than what had been announced in June but still a 
sizable amount.56 At this point Sheffield was 10.6 per cent above target and so they decided to revise 
their planned current expenditure for the year. Despite this review of their current expenditure plans 
the Council were still 10.1 per cent above the Government's target. The Council therefore tried to send 
a message to Heseltine and the DoE, to suggest that they were willing to make savings, but that the 
size of Government enforced cuts were not feasible without seriously damaging the provision of 
Council services.  Its total planned expenditure of £198.131 million was 27.2 per cent above Grant 
Related Expenditure. The total block grant entitlement loss, if Heseltine's proposal was approved, 
would amount to £5.7 million.57 Although the Council had agreed on the 14th July to reduce current 
expenditure by £790,400 these savings were clearly not enough.58 
The Council's warning that cuts would lead to deteriorating services had some effect. The following 
month the Budget Sub-Committee pushed for further savings. At a meeting on the 12th October it was 
decided that the Council should 'continue its present exercise of reviewing the spending committees' 
revenue budgets and the use of resources to eliminate any possibility of waste or under-utilisation of 
resources'. What made this different from previous commitments to making savings was that the 
emphasis was placed on Council manpower. While they were still committed to maintaining the 
current level of Council employment, 'the full co-operation of all concerned in avoiding the selfish 
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protection of narrow interests rather than the best use of resources' was requested. Furthermore, the 
Chief Personnel Officer was instructed to engage in talks with the trade unions for the introduction of 
an early retirement scheme for Council staff. On top of this any vacancies would not be filled 'without 
the respective Chairmen of the spending committees concerned examining the priority of such 
vacancies'.59 This appears to be a contradictory move for a Council that in public was staunchly 
opposed to central government cuts and committed to preserving Council employment. Blunkett 
argued that it was essential that the Council made it 'absolutely clear that we are not renaging [sic] on 
our current policy of maintaining jobs and services'.60 
In an attempt to further drive down local authority expenditure, the Thatcher Government pushed 
ahead with the Local Government Finance Bill, introduced into Parliament on the 6th November 1981. 
Much like the Local Government, Planning and Land Bill it had a tumultuous time in Parliament. A 
second Bill was introduced shortly after with the most significant alteration being the banning of 
supplementary rates. The original Bill had proposed that supplementary rates could be raised but only 
through referenda. Supplementary rates had been raised by some local authorities to offset the losses 
in central government funding. Whilst the Council congratulated those who opposed the first Local 
Government Finance Bill it recognised that there was 'still continued encroachment on already 
shrinking freedoms for local communities to determine the level and scope of their own services'. 
Furthermore, the position of the Council was that it 'expresses grave concern at the centralist and 
autocratic nature of further restrictions and the threat which withdrawal of grant would pose part-way 
through a financial year'. In terms of the banning of supplementary rates, whilst the Council had 
'never had recourse to a supplementary rate' it did recognise the 'right of Authorities (including those 
of different political persuasions) to exercise the right in the best interests of their electors'.61 It is safe 
to say that this stand had little effect on the determination of the Thatcher Government to control local 
authority expenditure. 
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July 1982 to June 1984: Sheffield fights back 
The Local Government Finance Act 1982 was given Royal Assent on the 13th July and it appeared that 
it was business as usual in the central-local government conflict over local authority expenditure. The 
City Treasurer, outlining the provisions of the Act, acknowledged that it 'continues the drift of control 
away from local authorities towards central government.'62 On the 27th July Heseltine made a 
statement to the Consultative Council on Local Government Finance on local government expenditure 
and exchequer grant. He announced that total grant would be cut by £201 million in 1981-82, and 
£312 million in 1982-83, because some local authorities were still refusing to comply with the 
Government's guidance on expenditure. The DoE would also 'penalise more severely than during the 
current financial year'.63 
Surprisingly, an apparent break in the trend of the central-local government conflict shown in this 
chapter did occur. At a meeting of the Budget Sub-Committee on the 14th December 1982 it was 
announced that the DoE had approved an additional capital expenditure allocation of £200,000.64 In 
October the Council had received a letter from the DoE, sent round to the Chief Executives of local 
authorities in England, 'concerning a likely substantial underspending on capital during the current 
financial year and inviting local authorities to submit applications […] for additional capital 
expenditure'.65 The Council were eager to take this opportunity. This was an example of pragmatism 
from the Thatcher Government; a sign that if Government guidelines were followed it would be have 
recognised. However, evidence from the Sheffield Archives provides a different interpretation. 
Thatcher had recently met the Group of Eight, the body representing all sides and parts of the 
construction industry. The meeting saw the Group voice their disappointment at the continuing 
decrease in local authority and nationalised industry capital investment which was falling below the 
Government's public expenditure provision.66 This move by the Thatcher Government was in order to 
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satisfy the demands of the construction industry rather than to offer an olive branch to hostile local 
authorities. It was decided by the Policy Committee that a further bid of £500,000 be submitted to the 
DoE.67 
The Council then went on the attack. On the 16th December Heseltine announced to Parliament the 
DoE's proposals for changes to the 1982-83 RSG and the 1983-84 RSG settlement. Despite warnings 
'about the holdback scheme before they [local authorities] drew up their budgets' this was ignored and 
so holdback for 1982-83 would amount to £308 million. In terms of the RSG settlement for 1983-84 
those local authorities who underspent would see their individual expenditure targets increase slightly 
beyond 4 per cent over actual spending for the current financial year, however, those who overspent, 
like Sheffield, would see their target set at a 1 per cent reduction from their budget for the current 
financial year.68 In response to this the Budget Sub-Committee condemned Heseltine's actions and 
asked the Head of Administration and Legal Department 'to investigate and report back on the 
possibility of the Council's instituting legal proceedings against the Secretary of State'.69 It was 
reported back to the Committee on the 15th February 1983 that after conducting an investigation the 
Head of Administration and Legal Department had been 'advised that there were no grounds for 
challenging the actions taken by the Secretary of State so far on this matter.'70 
The Conservative victory in the June 1983 general election paved the way for a more concerted effort 
in tackling defiant local authorities. Patrick Jenkin, a zealous Thatcherite, was appointed Secretary of 
State for the Environment, replacing Tom King (King had replaced Heseltine in January 1983 after he 
had been moved to Ministry of Defence). The outlook was bleak for the opposing local authorities. 
The Chairman of the Policy Committee's Policy Review Sub-Committee commented on the proposals 
of the new Government, outlined in their manifesto, 'to introduce further measures to control centrally 
local government spending levels and the ability of local authorities to raise and spend money in line 
with local decisions on the level and quality of services to be provided.' This was largely in reference 
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to the pledge in the manifesto to 'legislate to curb excessive and irresponsible rate increases by high-
spending councils, and to provide a general scheme for limitation of rate increases for all local 
authorities to be used if necessary.'71 This pledge would later become the Rates Act 1984 which will 
be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. The City Treasurer commented that 'the Government 
clearly feels that it had not yet gone far enough in its endeavours to control local government 
spending'.72 The Policy review Sub-Committee took the following action: 
That (a) the Chief Publicity Officer be authorised (i) to provide information which will 
(A) assist the case for retaining local government autonomy and against restrictions on 
the operation or existence of local democracy and (B) promote public enterprise and 
services and oppose their removal from the democratic control of accountable local 
representatives and (ii) to take any other action which may be necessary in lobbying 
for the afore-mentioned [sic] aims and which may be authorised by the Chairman of 
the Policy Committee or the Chairman of the Publicity and Mayoral Panel of the 
Municipal Enterprise and General Services Programme Committee.73 
The focus was moving away from making savings and was being pushed towards the increased 
production of 'propaganda' to combat central government policy. Much like the conflict over the Right 
to Buy, it was the issue of the creation of 'propaganda' that saw the Council once again adopting a 
rather contradictory position. While the Council's central government funding was being cut, they still 
managed to find available funds to allocate to a programme of 'propaganda'. The Council believed that 
this position was justified because it contributed to its survival as a stalwart opponent to the Thatcher 
Government, something that they strongly believed the people of Sheffield both needed and wanted. It 
was hoped that this 'propaganda' would help galvanise the people of Sheffield into joining the national 
movement against the changes to local government finance. The Council's previous strong rhetoric had 
seen Blunkett emerge as a key figure within the movement. The Policy Review Sub-Committee 
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recommended the creation of the Central Policy Unit which from the 1st July would play a pivotal role 
in producing anti-Government policy 'propaganda' and formulating the Council's approach to tackling 
rate capping under the Rates Act 1984. The Council were not unfamiliar with the dissemination of 
'propaganda'. Council-created 'propaganda' had played a significant role in the fight against the 
Housing Act 1980 and the Right to Buy, and they had already made significant contributions to 
publicity campaigns highlighting the injustice of central government cuts to local government. 
Blunkett would later set up a Local Government Campaign Working Party to assist in the campaign.74 
The rate capping proposals were increasingly becoming the main focus of the Policy Committee. The 
Government White Paper (Cmnd. 9008) - 'Rates' - laying out the proposals for rate limitation was 
scrutinised at by the Budget Sub-Committee on the 16th August. The response was, as to be expected, 
a negative one: 'the City Council is opposed to both the general and selective rate limitation schemes 
as proposed in the Government's White Paper on rate limitation and reform of the rating system'.75 
When the minutes came up for discussion at the meeting of the Council on the 7th September, Heslop 
together with his Conservative colleague Irvine Patnick, tried to reverse the position of the Council in 
regard to the Government's proposals. They put forward an amendment that the Council instead 
'welcomes the White Paper on rate limitation and the reform of the rating system' and 'recognises the 
burden on the ratepayers of Sheffield created by persistent Council overspending over the past few 
years.' They also proposed that the Council 'instructs all appropriate officers to investigate and report 
back on the action necessary to ensure that in future Council expenditure is kept within the limits laid 
by Central Government.'76 This amendment was rejected. 
Jenkin took the Council by surprise when during a statement made on the 20th October 1983 he gave 
details of an adjusted grant penalty scheme that would be in operation for 1984-85. The implications 
of this new scheme for Sheffield meant that at the bottom end of the penalty scale each additional £1 
spent in 1984-85 would cost the ratepayer £1.41 compared to £1.16 in 1983-84. At the top end of the 
scale, above target expenditure by 3 per cent or more, each additional £1 spent would be equivalent to 
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a £3.19 cost to the ratepayer in 1984-85 compared to £2.20 in the current financial year.77 The inability 
of central government, as of yet, to control rate increases meant that in the case of Sheffield and many 
other local authorities the reduction in grant through 'holdback' was being passed onto the ratepayer. 
At a special meeting of the Policy Committee on the 31st October the Committee condemned the 
Government and Jenkin 'for the total lack of consultation with the local authority associations prior to 
the announcement'. They also deplored 'the severity of the penalties to be imposed on local authorities 
and the consequential increases in rates which they could trigger throughout the country'.78 
Central government control over rate increases was not far away; with the Bill being published on the 
20th December it became a major item of business at the meeting of the Council on the 4th January 
1984. A motion was put forward by Blunkett and fellow Labour Councillor Reverend Alan Billings, 
Chairman of the Budget Sub-Committee, stating that the Council 'unequivocally condemns the 
proposals set out in the Rates Bill'. They detested the idea that the Secretary of State would be given 
the power to determine rate levels thus giving central government the right to control 'the quality of 
services and budget of local authorities'. Some may argue that central government, as the provider of a 
large portion of local government expenditure, should have a say in local matters such as the rates. 
What outraged councillors like Blunkett was the fact that this move by the Government was a drastic 
unconstitutional change that threatened any independence of local authorities from central 
government. Local authorities are after all provided with their own individual mandates through 
democratic local elections. Blunkett and Billings saw the proposals in the Rates Bill as 'a dangerous, 
anti-democratic throwback to the 19th Century'. Their motion emphasised the Council's belief that it 
was the right of those living in Sheffield to 'decide local needs and to raise income from local rates', 
and at the same time called on them to 'join with democrats throughout the country in a united 
campaign to preserve long-held freedoms and the right to disagree with Central Government'.79 The 
motion was passed without a single amendment despite attempts from Heslop and Patnick, and then 
Chadwick and Griffiths. The Council would later produce a film, at a total cost of £16,800, on the 
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likely effects of the rate capping legislation after authorisation from the Local Government Campaign 
Working Party.80 
At the same meeting questions were put to Blunkett by Graham Cheetham, the Conservative 
councillor who had played a significant role in trying to align the Council's stance with that of the 
Thatcher Government in regard to housing policy. Cheetham asked Blunkett, as Chairman of the 
Policy Committee, what the Government's target for revenue expenditure for 1983-84 was, against 
which, full RSG would have been forthcoming; Blunkett's answer was £206 million. The Council's 
budgeted figure of revenue expenditure for 1983-84 was £220.3 million resulting in a grant loss of 
approximately £12.8 million.81 This loss in grant was being offset by higher rates. 
While the production of anti-Government 'propaganda' and the rate capping legislation dominated the 
focus of the Council the actions taken to save money, seen earlier in this chapter, were still taking 
place. On the 15th May 1984 the Budget Sub-Committee considered a report by the City Treasurer on 
the new approach to audit which had been implemented the previous month. An important aspect of 
the new audit process was to achieve 'economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the services provided 
by the Council.' Two exercises had been undertaken, the first to do with water and sewerage charges 
and the second to do with revised administrative procedures, which would achieve annual savings of 
£45,000 and £30,000 respectively. These were miniscule savings in comparison to the gap that needed 
to be closed. The Committee authorised the City Treasurer to go ahead and implement the latter 
exercise.82 
June 1984 to May 1985: Division within the Labour Group 
The Council continued to step up their 'propaganda'. At the meeting of the Policy Review Sub-
Committee on the 5th June the actions taken by the Local Government Campaign Working Party were 
confirmed. The Working Party had authorised Market Opinion Research International (MORI) to 
conduct an opinion survey in Sheffield on public attitudes to local and central government. The 
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Working Party were clearly confident that the survey would be damning of the Thatcher Government. 
They had also ordered the production of 1,000 copies of an information pack that would describe the 
rate capping legislation, no doubt in a negative light.83 This was a rather small amount for a city with 
a population of over 500,000. However, on the 19th June the Budget Sub-Committee approved an 
additional sum of £100,500 for 'the further development of the Council's campaign for the defence of 
local government during the remainder of the current financial year'. Part of this money would go 
towards making the 'existing temporary posts of Campaign Officer and Clerk/Typist' permanent 
positions, a clear example of the anti-Government 'propaganda' campaign becoming more of a full-
time occupation for the Council.84 
A week later Royal Assent was given to the Rates Act 1984 which ushered in the final phase of the 
central-local government conflict that is the focus of this chapter. Sheffield had been defiant when it 
came to the rates. In 1980 they put up the rates by 41 per cent and by 37 per cent in 1981 without 
facing an electoral backlash at the local level in 1982, 1983 or 1984.85 These rate increases would 
have been partly influenced by the high levels of inflation during these years (18 per cent in 1980 and 
12 per cent in 1981). The MORI poll that had been authorised by the Council in June 1984 had shown 
that 60 per cent of respondents blamed central government for the annual rate increases, rising up to 
76 per cent of Labour voters.86 Although the Labour Member of Parliament for Heeley, Bill Michie, 
would use the results of the poll to attack Jenkin in Parliament in July 1984 they showed that a 
significant minority did not blame central government. It is a suggestion that Sheffield was perhaps 
not as united as Blunkett thought.  
The Council were not happy with increasing the rates year-on-year. In fact the Council were in favour 
of rate reform, something the Thatcher Government had promised to introduce since coming to power 
in May 1979. At a meeting of the Council on the 6th May 1981 a motion had been passed calling for a 
new rating system that was 'more just and equitable', reversed 'the present trend towards centralisation 
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of government by restoring to local authorities the freedom to meet local needs' and afforded 'greater 
protection to [the] manufacturing industry'.87 The motion also mentioned the Council's regret over the 
'non-implementation of the Layfield Committee's recommendation on basing the rating system on 
capital values'.88 Had rating reform been implemented there might have been the possibility that the 
battle over rate capping might not have taken place. 
On the 24th July Jenkin announced to the House of Commons the 18 local authorities which would be 
subject to rate limitation under the Rates Act 1984. The following local authorities were selected: 
Basildon, Brent, Camden, the GLC, Greenwich, Hackney, Haringey, the Inner London Education 
Authority (ILEA), Islington, Lambeth, Leicester, Lewisham, Merseyside, Portsmouth, Sheffield, 
Southwark, South Yorkshire, and Thamesdown. 16 of the selected authorities were Labour-controlled; 
Portsmouth was Conservative-controlled and Brent was ruled by a Conservative-Liberal coalition. 
The criteria for selection were local authorities 'spending more than £10 million whose budgets for the 
current year are more than 4 per cent above their targets, and more than 20 per cent above their grant-
related expenditure assessment.'89 The selected local authorities could appeal against their target to the 
Secretary of State however they would refuse to use the appeal procedure 'as it gave enormous power 
to the Environment Secretary to examine budgets.'90 The Labour Member of Parliament for Copeland, 
Dr. John Cunningham, responded to Jenkin's statement by asking if he was aware that what had been 
announced was 'an unprecedented and giant stride along the authoritarian path to central control and 
one that he will almost certainly live to regret?'91 
Labour's Martin Flannery, Member of Parliament for Hillsborough, came to the defence of Sheffield 
City Council. Challenging Jenkin, he asked why the Secretary of State was 'pursuing such a wicked 
vendetta against the people of Sheffield when increases have been more than 2 per cent below the 
national average since 1978-79 and 8 per cent [...] since 1981-82'. Flannery wondered whether this 
vendetta was because 'the people of Sheffield have consistently increased their Labour vote 
                                                     
87
 SCSL, 352.042 SQ, Meeting of the City Council, 6th May 1981, p. 1143. 
88
 Ibid., p. 1143. 
89
 HC Deb, 24th July 1984, vol. 64, col. 828. 
90
 Lansley et al., Councils in Conflict, p. 37. 
91
 HC Deb, 24th July 1984, vol. 64, col. 830. 
67 
 
throughout that period due to the good local government provided in that city'.92 Fellow Labour 
Member of Parliament Patrick Duffy shared the sentiment: 'Where does the scope for improvement in 
Sheffield lie without crippling its services and creating job losses? Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman 
was venting his political spleen on what is, after all, a Labour citadel.'93 
The tone of the response from the Policy Committee to the selective rate limitation was not surprising. 
Voted through unopposed by the Committee it put forward a scathing attack from the Council towards 
the Secretary of State's proposals. Deploring the proposals, they demanded that the Secretary of State 
withdraw the plans to limit the Council's spending and made it clear that they intended to prepare a 
budget that would 'enable necessary services and jobs to be maintained and provide additional 
expenditure for areas of increased need'. This statement reiterated the Council's view that spending 
should be dictated by policy aims rather than by a desire to keep the rates low. It was also made clear 
that the Council would refuse to enter into negotiations with Jenkin in relation to the 1985-86 budget 
and rate limitation because, as mentioned earlier, it would expose the Council's spending plans to 
Government scrutiny. As well as exposing the Council's spending plans it would flag up the creative 
accountancy techniques that the Council, like many other Labour-controlled local authorities, were 
engaged in. Nick Devas states that one of the methods used by these local authorities, which he refers 
to as 'creative accounting', would have been the 'sale-and-leaseback of municipal capital assets, in 
which assets are sold in order to release capital funds and then are leased back […] as a way of 
avoiding stringent controls on borrowing'.94 The Council also committed to continuing the review of 
'the effectiveness of its existing services with a view to making them more responsive and relevant to 
the needs of the people of Sheffield'. The use of 'more responsive and relevant' is somewhat 
ambiguous as to whether this statement translates into expanding Council services or making them 
more efficient.  Furthermore, the Council would consider the 'introduction of some form of 
"community inquiry" into the services of the Council in order to determine clearly that the Council is 
not guilty of overspending'. This exercise was to prove that the Council were in fact 'failing to satisfy 
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the growing level of need'.95 The 'propaganda' was further amped up. A further £73,000 was approved 
for 'various activities and work to publicise the Council's response'.96 
It was not just Sheffield and their local authority allies that were critical of the Government's approach 
to local government. The Audit Commission, established with the passing of the Local Government 
Finance Act 1982, had produced a report reviewing the impact of the block grant system. The 
Commission were critical of the block grant system for several reasons: there were 'too many 
unnecessary uncertainties inherent in the system'; these uncertainties had resulted in local authorities 
building up reserves; 'serious distortions' were emerging due to inadequate information of local needs; 
targets had encouraged some local authorities to spend more which, given the Government's aims, 
seemed contradictory; central government involvement had not been reduced while 'managerial 
accountability [had] not been strengthened; the system was too complex; and the system provided 
'few incentives for local authorities to improve their efficiency and effectiveness'.97 The City 
Treasurer, who compiled the summary of the Commission's findings, stated that 'the Audit 
Commission has added its name to the long list of those who have criticised the grant system and the 
manner in which its workings have been distorted by the imposition of targets and penalties.'98 The 
Commission after all was independent and not a mouthpiece for central government. To further 
contextualise what had been happening to Sheffield financially over the past four years, it is worth 
nothing that since 1980-81 RSG as a percentage of Council income had fallen by 31 per cent while 
the rates and balances had increased by 53 per cent. Over the same period the Council had suffered 
£116 million in block grant losses.99 On the 5th December the Policy Committee referred to the 
Commission's findings when it reiterated its call for the Government to drop the rate capping 
proposals, abandon the system of targets and penalties, and restore RSG to the 1978-79 level.100  
                                                     
95
 SA, CA-POL/17, Meeting of the Policy Committee, 27th July 1984, pp. 245-5. 
96
 SA, CA-POL/17, Meeting of the Budget Sub-Committee, 31st August 1984, p. 314. 
97
 SA, CA-POL/17, Summary of the Audit Commission's Report on the Impact on Local Government of the 
Block Grant System, 12th September 1984, p. 1. 
98
 Ibid., p. 5. 
99
 Ibid., p. 2. 
100
 SA, CA-POL/18, Meeting of the Policy Committee, 5th December 1984, p. 52. 
69 
 
The 18 local authorities selected for rate limitation had agreed in November to take joint action 
against the Government by refusing to set a rate for 1985-86. A collective letter from the leaders of 
the designated local authorities had been sent to Jenkin on the 29th November accusing the Secretary 
of State of theft: 'Since 1981-82 you have robbed English local government of £8.4 billion of Rate 
Support Grant.' The same demands that would be the subject of the Policy Committee's meeting of the 
5th December were made.101 These demands were flatly rejected by Jenkin in a reply made on the 11th 
December.102 On the same day the rate limitations were announced. For Sheffield the maximum rate 
was to be set at 207.07p for each pound of rateable value for domestic properties and the Council had 
until the 15th January 1985 to inform the Secretary of State whether they accepted the proposed 
maximum rate or not.103 The rate was 208.24p for 1984-85 and so although the limit did not equate to 
a sizeable reduction in spending it would halt the trend of annual rate increases to offset losses in 
central government funding.104 At a meeting of the Policy Committee on the 9th January they 
reiterated the Council's 'rejection of the Rates Act as an undemocratic means of controlling local 
spending' and made it clear that they did not endorse the rate limit because the Council did 'not accept 
the premise upon which such a limit [was] based'.105 
Attempts to mount legal proceedings against the Secretary of State and the DoE had fallen flat in 
February 1983. This did not deter the Council from again trying to use the judicial process to fight 
against central government cuts. A report from the 15th January 1985, containing representations to be 
made to Jenkin, laid out the basis for a legal challenge. The root of the legal challenge was to do with 
the block grant and grant related expenditure assessments. Sheffield's grant related expenditure 
assessment for 1985-86 had been set at £187.1 million, an increase of 3.5 per cent on the previous 
year. So far it is hard to see why the Council would have had any complaints. Their frustration was 
built around the fact that the national average increase for the year was 6.7 per cent and their grant 
related expenditure assessment per head would be below the average for metropolitan districts by £26 
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for 1985-86. It appears that Sheffield might have been treated unfairly. The report stated that the 
changes made by the Secretary of State to the Council's central government funding - changes to 
RSG, cash limiting, distributional changes and penalties - had resulted in a £10 million loss in 1985-
86 and an accumulated loss of £151 million since 1980-81.106 According to Blunkett, when the loss of 
central government housing subsidy during this period is included, the accumulated total rose up to 
nearly £240 million.107 A special meeting of the Policy Committee was called for the 18th February 
where authorisation was given to press ahead with the legal proceedings. Interestingly the Committee 
added on that 'subject to further legal advice […] the actions of the Secretary of State under the Rates 
Act 1984 in prescribing the maximum rate for Sheffield' be also challenged.108 There had been no 
mention of rate capping in the report of the 15th January. 
On the 25th February a debate on rate limitation got underway in the House of Commons; Sheffield 
was frequently mentioned. Labour Member of Parliament Jack Straw called out Jenkin for targeting 
Sheffield: 'Is he [Jenkin] not aware that Mr John Banham, the Controller of his Audit Commission, 
said that Sheffield provided outstanding value for money and that its increase in expenditure since 
1978 is exactly the same as the national average?'109 Straw continued by saying that Banham had 
commented that rate capping and value for money were not connected and the cut in Sheffield's grant 
was '"a lot of money to be losing."'110 Patrick Duffy also fought for Sheffield's cause in Parliament. He 
laid out the £10 million grant reduction and the 3.5 per cent grant related expenditure assessment 
increase which the Council were trying to mount a legal challenge against. He also attacked rate 
limitation proposals for leaving 'an expenditure gap of at least £31 million on a standstill budget of 
£249 million for 1985-86.'111 Put simply, the cuts that Jenkin was seeking were, according to Duffy, 
'not achievable in a single year without decimating services in areas that are predominantly the 
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responsibility of deprived, inner-city authorities.'112 For Sheffield this would decimate the provision of 
slum clearance and the modernisation of the current housing stock, already hit hard by changes to 
central government funding for local authority housing. It would also have a negative effect on the 
work of the Employment Department, created in 1981, which was tasked with stopping 'the tide of job 
losses […] by sponsoring employment projects, by assisting in the development of new products, and 
by creating its own enterprise and technology zones.'113 Due to the severe cuts to services that rate 
limitation would impose Sheffield City Council had 'no choice but to resist.'114 
It was usual practice for the Policy Committee to hold a special meeting around the end of February to 
consider the revenue budget for the upcoming financial year and recommend a general rate for 
Sheffield. On the 28th February the Policy Committee broke from this tradition and decided, 15 votes 
to 1 with 1 abstaining, that the Committee would not recommend a rate to be considered at the 
meeting of the City Council on the 7th March. At this point Blunkett appears to be standing united 
with the other rate capped councils like Lambeth and Liverpool by refusing to set a rate. This was the 
first act in a turbulent play that would continue for the next three months. 
At the meeting of the City Council on the 7th March, a day after 'a massive demonstration'115 in 
Sheffield against rate capping, the revenue budget and the general rate were discussed. While 
reviewing the proceedings of the Policy Committee from the 28th February Blunkett, seconded by 
Labour councillor Alan Wigfield, put forward as an amendment that the Council 'finds it impossible 
in the present circumstances at this meeting to go forward and to make a rate for 1985-86'.116 This 
amendment was passed 59 votes to 26 with 1 abstaining. The Conservative and SDP-Liberal Alliance 
councillors made up the 26 opposing votes. An amendment was then put forward by Conservative 
councillors David Heslop and John Niell calling for a revenue budget in the amount of £215,833,000 
which was equivalent to a general rate in the pound of 194.92p. This budget would be achieved by 
making £22,535,000 in savings on the £249,600,000 budget for 1985-86 as presented by the City 
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Treasurer. Furthermore £11,800,000 in reserves would be used and improvements in services 
amounting to £560,000 would take place.117 This would see the revenue budget and the general rate 
fall within central government targets. This amendment was rejected 66 votes to 17 with 1 abstaining. 
Although the SDP-Liberal Alliance councillors were opposed to Blunkett's amendment, they clearly 
did not agree at that moment in time with the Conservative position of setting a legal rate and a 
reduced budget, and they consequently joined the Labour Group to oppose Heslop and Niell. A 
further amendment calling for a special meeting of the Policy Committee to look at implementing 
such savings was also rejected. Blunkett's original motion with the crucial call for the Council not to 
call a rate was then passed 56 votes to 26 with 1 abstaining.118 So far the Labour Group were standing 
united against rate capping. Three days later the GLC, with its Labour Group split into three factions, 
agreed to set a legal rate. It was a day and night of 'insults, absurdities, posturing, exaggeration, 
manipulation and caricature'.119 It was the first of the 18 rate capped local authorities to comply with 
the Rates Act 1984. The messy capitulation of the GLC when faced with rate capping was a hammer 
blow to the morale of the rate capped local authorities. 
After failing to agree on a revenue budget and set a general rate for 1985-86 an 'Extraordinary 
Meeting of the Council of the City of Sheffield' was called for the 28th March.120 Three motions had 
been received by the Chief Executive to be discussed at the meeting. The first motion, moved by 
Heslop and Neill, called for a revenue budget in the amount of £218,516,400 equivalent to a general 
rate in the pound of 206.87p. £19,283,600 in savings would be made and £11,800,000 of reserves 
would be used to reach this spending target.121 The second motion, moved by Betts and Wigfield, 
called for 'the Policy Committee to consider the questions of the revenue budget and general rate for 
the financial year 1985-86.'122 This was essentially deferring the setting of a general rate. The third 
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and final motion, moved by Chadwick and Griffiths, called for a general rate of 206.87p but did not 
define a budget. Instead their motion called for the abolition of the Budget Sub-Committee and its 
replacement with a Revenue Review Sub-Committee which would formulate a revenue budget for 
1985-86 and 'monitor expenditure during the financial year in such a way as to act within the law 
while safeguarding essential services throughout the City'.123 At this point Blunkett and the Labour 
Group were still committed to challenging the Rates Act 1984 and so Labour councillors Helen 
Jackson and Sam Wall moved that the second motion be considered before the first; the motion was 
then carried. The meeting was adjourned and the Council remained without a revenue budget and a 
general rate with the beginning of the new financial year only days away. 
To make sure that the work of local government in Sheffield continued while the financial situation 
was left unresolved the Policy Committee had been given emergency powers to approve expenditure 
decisions on behalf of the Council which were urgently required to be made.124 These decisions 
included the payment of salaries and wages, the fulfilment of contractual agreements entered into 
before the beginning of the 1985-86 financial year, and expenditure essential to maintaining basic 
services.125 Sheffield, like the rest of the local authorities on the rate capping list, had until the 7th May 
to set a rate otherwise surcharge and disqualification could be used against the leading councillors. 
Negotiations within the Council continued throughout April but no agreement was reached on a 
revenue budget or a general rate. On the surface this presents Blunkett and the Labour Group as 
maintaining their strong public image as a radical opponent to the Thatcher Government and the Rates 
Act 1984. However, David Price argues that Blunkett, Betts and Billings were 'convinced that a 
balanced budget and rate had to be set.' Here is another clear example of this public/private position 
dichotomy. Blunkett wanted to defer setting a rate 'in the hope that the Government would back down' 
resulting in his retention of the 'national leadership of the non-setting campaign, thus heading off 
extremists like Derek Hatton of Liverpool'; it was a 'dangerous game'.126 Blunkett favoured setting a 
rate and drawing up a deficit budget but when this option was presented to the District Labour Party 
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(DLP), which was more attuned to Knight and Hatton's 'hard left' ideology, it was overruled 81 votes 
to 48.127 The decision made by the DLP surrounding the Rates Act 1984 'created considerable political 
and personal antagonisms between the DLP and the Labour Group and between individual councillors 
with claims and counter-claims of political "sell-out" and irresponsibility.'128 
The game that Blunkett and his inner circle had been playing was soon to backfire, leading to their 
humiliation. It had been hoped that the Thatcher Government would capitulate under the pressure 
from the rebelling local authorities but, as with the conflict surrounding the Housing Act 1980, 
Blunkett had underestimated the determination of the Government to ensure that central policy was 
implemented.  The 7th May brought the final hammer blow that broke the resolve of the Labour 
Group. Blunkett and Wigfield put forward a motion deploring 'the Secretary of State's decision not to 
negotiate with affected Local Authorities, the opposition Environment Front Bench Spokesmen, Local 
Authority Associations or Members of Parliament representing seats within the affected Local 
Authorities'. Furthermore, it stated that the Council 'recognises that it cannot set a legal rate which 
will meet the needs and wishes of the people of Sheffield in this and subsequent years [...] until it has 
obtained from the Government the means to enable it to carry out its Revenue and Capital 
Programmes'.129 Blunkett was making the position of the Council clear: there will be no compromise 
when it came to setting a rate. 
Blunkett was clearly unaware that the experience of the GLC back in March was about to be repeated 
in Sheffield. According to Patrick Seyd the Labour Group in Sheffield was split between the 
'accommodators' and the 'resisters'; the former were in favour of setting a rate once surcharge and 
disqualification had been threatened while the latter refused to compromise and wanted to take on the 
Government directly.130 Publicly Blunkett had portrayed himself as a 'resister' whereas in reality he 
had more in common with the 'accommodators'. It was his position as one of the leading figures of the 
anti-rate capping movement, seemingly standing shoulder to shoulder with the likes of Knight and 
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Hatton, which essentially cornered him into this position. Labour councillor Dr Peter Jones, 
predecessor to Betts as Chairman of the Housing Committee and an 'accommodator', proposed an 
amendment that was a direct challenge to Blunkett. The amendment, while deploring the Rates Act 
1984 and acknowledging that central government policy had left insufficient funds to 'meet the 
growing needs of Sheffield',  proposed setting the maximum prescribed rate of 207.7p.131 To 
Blunkett's dismay, a key figure within the Labour Group was pushing forward the idea that the 
Council should abide by the Rates Act 1984 and set a legal rate. The amendment was seconded by 
Sam Wall, the Labour councillor who had helped to maintain Blunkett's stance during the meeting of 
the Council on the 28th March. The Labour Group had publicly split. The amendment, however, was 
defeated by 38 votes to 37 with 10 abstaining. Although still just about in control of the situation it 
must have been clear to Blunkett that he had lost control of the Labour Group as 20 of his councillors 
joined with the Conservatives in an attempt to set a legal rate. All that was needed now for the setting 
of a legal rate was the support of the SDP-Liberal Alliance councillors. 
The tide was turning against Blunkett and his followers within the Labour Group. Jones and Wall 
again moved for another amendment but this time changed the language so that it contained no 
criticism of the Thatcher Government in the setting of the rate. This new amendment did not include 
any statement of intent to negotiate further with the DoE to improve the financial situation for 
Sheffield nor did it make any commitment to continue legal proceedings against the Government. 
This was a crucial move to securing the support of the SDP-Liberal Alliance councillors. The 
maximum prescribed rate of 207.7p was put forward again and this time it was passed 46 votes to 38 
with 1 abstaining.132 In total 20 Labour councillors joined with 17 Conservatives and 9 Liberals to set 
the rate during what Blunkett called 'the worst night of my life'.133 The meeting had been 'one of the 
most dramatic in the Council's history'.134 Sheffield City Council had finally set a rate and some 
normality could begin to return. 
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At first glance the split that occurred within the Labour Group appears to have been an offshoot of the 
split that occurred within the Labour Party four years earlier. The meeting of the Council on the 7th 
May seemed to pitch the hard left of the Labour Group, the uncompromising 'resisters', against 
moderates like Jones and Wall. Indeed the events of that night highlighted the differences between the 
DLP and the Labour Group, creating both political and personal divisions between the two. After the 
rate capping split some within the Labour Group were 'politically and personally exhausted by the 
struggles' and withdrew themselves from the frontline of local politics.135 However, where the split of 
the Labour Group differs from that of the wider Labour Party is in the much smaller role that 
ideological differences played in it. Rather than being a battle between the different political factions 
within the Labour Group the split was the result of one group pushing to avoid surcharge and 
disqualification. It was a split based more on the idea of practicality rather than ideology. The Labour 
Group was united when it came to the issues of providing Council services and the opposition to the 
Government's approach to reforming local government. It simply came down to the unwillingness of a 
significant group of Labour councillors to break the law.  Even Blunkett himself was leaning towards 
setting a legal rate but his national prominence left him unable to compromise. It took Labour 
councillors like Jones and Wall to vote through a legal rate with the support of Conservative and SDP-
Liberal Alliance councillors to save Blunkett from being cast into the political wilderness for defying 
central government and breaking the law. The Labour rebels had in fact saved Blunkett's career.136 He 
would soon move on to Westminster politics, something that would have been made impossible by 
the legal consequences of the Council persisting to refuse to set a rate. In October 1985 Blunkett gave 
a speech at the Labour Party Conference which later became a crucial step in Kinnock's banning of 
Militant Tendency from the Labour Party. 
Throughout the battle over local government finance the Labour Group in Sheffield had put up a 
united front with the actions of leading figures like Blunkett and Billings being widely supported at 
the meetings of the full Council. However the Rates Act 1984 left them unable to resist any further 
without venturing into illegality, something that they did not have the necessary political willpower 
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for which realistically would have been unsuccessful anyway. The unity that was displayed until the 
7th May would soon return within the Labour Group. On the 5th June the Council officially approved 
the rate but pushed through an expansionary budget with a strong focus on the elderly and low-paid 
workers that would be financed through the use of creative accounting to avoid a deficit: 'Sheffield 
was back to fighting the battle on technical grounds.'137 
Conclusion 
As with the conflict surrounding the implementation of the Right to Buy the Council and its leading 
figures underestimated the determination of the Thatcher Government when it came to local 
government finance reform. In the end, the Council did not have the necessary political willpower to 
effectively fight off the all-out offensive on their finances. The Council were quick to establish 
themselves in the beginning as a defiant opponent to the Thatcher Government's local government 
finance reforms. The meeting of the Policy Committee on the 4th July, where it was established that 
the Council must take a leading role in organising local authority opposition, suggested that Blunkett 
was in charge of a local authority that would be an uncompromising defender of the status quo. The 
Council were seen in public as standing united with Ted Knight's Lambeth and Derek Hatton's 
Liverpool. However, it was this public position, and the way that it directly contradicted Blunkett's 
private position, which made the Council's downfall inevitable. 
For the game that Blunkett and his allies in the Labour Group were playing to succeed it ultimately 
depended on the revival of Labour Party nationally and on the continuation of the Thatcher's 
Government's initial unpopularity. This is because the approach that Blunkett adopted could only 
disrupt the changes that were being implemented by the Government rather than stop them altogether. 
It was hoped that a revitalised Labour Party, in a similar fashion to what happened in 1974, would 
force a snap election and defeat the increasingly unpopular Thatcher Government. It was assumed that 
with Labour back in power central-local government relations would revert back to the 1974-79 
period of cooperation or even back to the era of expansion seen in the 1950s and 60s. Blunkett got it 
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drastically wrong. Rather than rising from the ashes the Labour Party ripped itself apart from the 
inside with the bitter infighting which saw the creation of the SDP whilst the early stages of economic 
recovery and the Falklands War saw Thatcher's popularity increase. Any hopes of a Labour 
government coming to the rescue of Sheffield City Council were torn apart after Thatcher's 
impressive victory in the 1983 general election. By this point the Council had firmly established itself 
as a troublesome opponent to local government finance reform. 
The problem for the Council in the decision making process was that councillors like Blunkett were 
not being honest with themselves. For example, at the meeting of the Policy Committee on the 21st 
October 1980 authority was given for the Chairman to tell the leader of Camden that the Council were 
willing to support the testing of the legality of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980. 
However, the Council were also in the process of negotiating with the DoE over a proposed £1.02 
million grant reduction. It was moments like these that exposed the public/private position dichotomy. 
Some may argue that the Council agreed to test the legality of the Act because the threat of legal 
action may have been useful in their negotiations with the DoE. This simply cannot be correct. The 
Council decided to make the savings that were required by the DoE around the same time that the Act 
was passed. This was a straight up loss for the Council as they had done exactly what the DoE had 
asked. If the Council were seriously committed to testing the legality of the Act they would have done 
so and not given in so quickly on the issue of making the required savings. 
As the tension between Sheffield City Council and the Thatcher Government increased the Council 
ramped up their rhetoric. As well as the fervent defiance shown in the minutes of the various 
committees and of the full Council the production of anti-Government 'propaganda' became a central 
weapon in attacking local government finance reform. Despite the reduction in the Council's central 
government funding money was still found for this purpose. It was believed that this expenditure was 
necessary as it was contributing to the survival of Sheffield City Council as a left-wing symbol of 
opposition; it was defending the democratic will of the people of Sheffield. The problem with this 
approach was that it portrayed the Council as an opponent to the Thatcher Government with the 
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power to challenge it when in fact there was very little that they could do. The 'propaganda' and acts 
of defiance were merely theatre. 
Rate capping pushed the Council to the brink. The theatrics of the Council in the years prior to the 
passing of the Rates Act 1984 gave the impression that Sheffield would not abide by the law and 
would stand united against the Thatcher Government. By the time the Government had the ability to 
rate cap high spending local authorities Sheffield was clearly positioned as a leading figure among the 
local authority opposition. Blunkett was seen as an uncompromising individual. This was all because 
of the public position that the Council had adopted. In fact Blunkett and his team wanted to set a legal 
rate and pass a deficit budget as soon as it became clear that the Council had exhausted all other legal 
options in the fight against rate capping. Blunkett could not climb down because the actions he had 
taken as both Leader of the Council and Chairman of the Policy Committee in the months and years 
prior to May 1985 gave the impression that he would fight to the very end. His place nationally within 
the left-wing opposition to the Thatcher Government meant that it would be a dramatic U-turn if the 
Council was to abide by the Rates Act 1984. The decision was further taken out of his hands when the 
DLP voted in favour of the Council not setting a legal rate. The DLP would have seen the Council's 
posturing and been further convinced that the Labour Group were unwavering in their commitment to 
fighting rate capping. Blunkett had flown too close to the sun. If Blunkett had backed down earlier, 
perhaps by resigning, the Council could have been saved from the chaos and humiliation that 
emerged. 
The division in the Labour Group on the 7th May was the result of political exhaustion. Many Labour 
councillors had grown tired of the increasingly unwinnable conflict that they were engaged in with the 
Thatcher Government. Seeing that surcharge and disqualification from office were looming on the 
horizon, along with more chaos that would come with further delaying to set a legal rate, Labour 
councillors Jones and Wall led the split. The split that occurred was not one that would bitterly divide 
the Labour Group for years to come as a month later unity returned with the passing of a budget that 
was paid for through the use of creative accounting. 
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What this investigation into the battle over local government finance between Sheffield City Council 
and the Thatcher Government has shown is the clear lack of power that Sheffield had in the central-
local government relationship. The theatrics of the Council could not be backed up by action. Only if 
they ventured into illegality, which clearly they were unwilling to do, would they have been able to 
further challenge central government policy. No matter how loud their protestations they were tied to 
central government financially and had to abide by the laws that Parliament passed. The Council 
could temporarily disrupt the implementation of Government policy by frustrating the efforts made 
under the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 and the Local Government Finance Act 
1982 through the exploitation of loopholes. Despite these manoeuvrings by the Council once the 
Rates Act 1984, the direct response to the actions of councils like Sheffield, had become law they 
were forced to toe the line. Sheffield had its own democratic mandate to rule in the interest of its 
voters. The Labour Group's views on spending and service provision were widely popular at the ballot 
box in local elections. Even after the capitulation of the Council in May 1985 the Labour Group won 
22 of 30 seats in the 1986 local elections, taking two from the Conservatives. The Government's ideas 
around what local government should be doing and spending were clearly at odds with a sizeable 
majority in Sheffield. This chapter then has highlighted the ambiguous position of local government 
and the tensions inherent in the idea of local democracy in a centralised state. 
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Conclusion 
 
The conflict between Sheffield City Council and the Thatcher governments was a long one. The 
Council and central government had battled it out for six years but in the end it was Thatcher who 
walked away victorious. In hindsight it was a conflict that in the absence of a crisis that would have 
ejected Thatcher from power the Council and their allies in the other Labour-controlled local 
authorities were always going to lose. The Housing Act 1980 put into law the Right to Buy. Once this 
had been guaranteed by law there was nothing that local authorities could do in the long-term to stop 
this from being implemented. They could of course venture into illegality by refusing outright to 
process Right to Buy applications and sales but only one local authority (Norwich City Council) 
decided to do this and they were ultimately defeated at the Divisional Court. The same went for the 
conflict over local government finance. Local authorities like Sheffield found ways to get around the 
Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 and the Local Government Finance Act 1982 by 
offsetting losses in central government grant through increasing the rates or through creative 
accounting. Once the Rates Act 1984 had been passed the ability to sidestep local government finance 
cuts was largely taken away. Local authorities were left with two options: venture into illegality or 
abide by the law. This stark choice caused the Labour Group to split and led to the defeat of the 
Council. Sheffield City Council were fully aware of the limited power that local government had in a 
centralised state. Their aim was to mount enough pressure onto central government in the hope that it 
would back down and to obstruct the implementation of key pieces of legislation until a Labour 
government returned to power.  
Due to the limited role of local government in the central-local government relationship the Council 
were heavily reliant on theatrics as a means of both challenging central government and gaining local 
and national support for their cause. This was seen with the conflict over the Housing Act 1980. At the 
meetings of the Housing Committee and of the full Council bold statements were made about the 
Council's strong opposition to the Right to Buy and about their willingness to challenge the 
Government head on. Council-produced 'propaganda' which opposed the Right to Buy, and put 
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forward the impression that the Council were in a position to challenge its implementation, further 
increased the image of the Council as a powerful opponent to the Thatcher Government. However, in 
reality all the Council were able to do was stall the implementation of the Right to Buy for as long as 
possible while putting pressure on central government in the hope that it would back down. Once it 
became clear that central government would not back down - Heseltine's threat of intervention under 
Section 23 clearly demonstrated this - it became apparent to Betts that the only option left was to 
break the law. This was something that people like Betts and Blunkett were unwilling to do. 
The same happened with the conflict over local government finance. The Council, with Blunkett 
leading the way, quickly established itself as a staunch opponent to local government cuts. As with 
the conflict over the Housing Act 1980 bold statements were made in committees like the Policy 
Committee and at the meetings of the full Council. These bold statements, publicised in the local print 
media, gave the people of Sheffield the impression that the Council would never back down in the 
face of central government pressure to make budget cuts. The 'propaganda' that the Council produced 
reinforced this impression. Sheffield's approach to challenging local government finance cuts 
established it and Blunkett as a national leader of the opposing left-wing local authorities alongside 
Ted Knight of Lambeth, Derek Hatton of Liverpool and Ken Livingstone of the GLC. The problem 
for Blunkett was that he ultimately got caught up in the moment. As made clear in chapter two, 
Blunkett was not as fervent in his opposition to local government cuts as his counterparts in Lambeth 
and Liverpool despite his strong left-wing credentials. The Council had made certain cuts that had 
been demanded by central government in the early years of the conflict and Blunkett, both as Leader 
of the Council and Chairman of the Policy Committee, had been instrumental in this decision-making 
process. Despite this he was more than happy to establish Sheffield at the national level as an 
unwavering opponent to local government finance cuts. It was this public/private position dichotomy 
that would largely contribute to the Council's downfall. Blunkett's public image as a staunch opponent 
to Thatcher's agenda left him unable to act on his private position. When it came to the possibility of 
venturing into illegality over the Rates Act 1984 Blunkett was left unable to back down despite the 
fact that privately he was in favour of setting a legal rate and passing a deficit budget. This resulted in 
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a split in the Labour Group led by Dr Peter Jones and Sam Wall. This split was not based on 
ideological differences but more on practicality. Jones and Wall knew that the only viable option was 
to adhere to the legal prescribed rate. It took a dramatic split in the Labour Group to save Blunkett 
from the consequences of his national image and to save the Council from intense legal scrutiny. 
These two separate but related investigations have set out how Sheffield City Council tried to fight 
against the implementation of the Housing Act 1980 and local government finance cuts. The Council 
were heavily reliant on theatrics in their efforts to defend against central government decisions.  As 
stated earlier in the introduction to this dissertation the aim of this research has not been to prescribe a 
remedy for the issue of centralism in the central-local government relationship, something that Jones 
and Stewart have already tried to do. Instead this dissertation has given two detailed examples of what 
can happen in the central-local government relationship when a centralist view is dominant. The 
question left now is whether this conflict between Sheffield City Council and central government 
could have been avoided. Jones and Stewart have argued for an Act that grants true localism. For 
them local government has become an administrative arm of central government. The government of 
the day passes laws that fit its agenda and local government implements them at the local level. This 
is the exact same relationship that was present between Sheffield City Council and the Thatcher 
governments. The difference here was that the Council were unwilling to implement central 
government policy without a fight, hence the conflict that occurred. Due to this administrative 
position of local government in the central-local government relationship there is very little for local 
authorities to do when it comes to challenging central government policy.  
The Council did not see the Housing Act 1980 as in the best interests of the people of Sheffield. They 
saw the Right to Buy as harmful to those who were dependant on Council-owned housing. Selling off 
Council stock reduced the number of homes available to those on the waiting list or to those who 
wanted to upgrade to a newer property. The cuts to central government funding for house building, 
repairs and slum clearance were also seen by the Council as harmful to the people of Sheffield. The 
Council had been a successful builder of rented accommodation for decades and the strong mandate 
that they had received from the local electorate in that time gave the strong impression that their 
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position as a dominant force for house building was widely supported. Ultimately the Council were in 
a much better position to judge the housing situation in Sheffield than a central government based in 
Whitehall. The same applies for levels of local government spending. Much like the situation 
concerning the Housing Act 1980 the Council did not view local government finance cuts as in the 
best interests of the people of Sheffield. The Council had in its opinion a long history of high 
spending through large amounts of investment in the provision of local services. The strong support 
that the Labour Group had received for decades at local elections again showed that this high 
spending agenda was popular in Sheffield. 
This was the problem with having a separate level of government within a centralised state. Sheffield 
City Council, a left-wing local authority with a strong local mandate, was in a position where they had 
to implement central government policy that was being devised by a political party on the opposite 
end of the political spectrum. This was the cause for the conflict that took place. This is still 
something that occurs today. There has been tension between central government and local authorities 
in the age of austerity with implementing expenditure cuts which run against the elected mandates of 
these local authorities. There is a need then, as argued by Jones and Stewart, for a government Act 
that introduces proper localism into the central-local government relationship. Local democracy is 
made redundant if a local authority with a strong mandate, be in Conservative, Labour or Liberal 
Democrat, is simply the administrator of central government policy, especially if that policy is the 
opposite to what individual local authorities were elected to do. Local government needs to be able to 
act in the best interests of its voters, something that Sheffield City Council tried to do. The central-
local government conflict that occurred in Sheffield in the 1980s shows that when there is a conflict of 
interest like this local government is limited in its ability to challenge the centre. Local government 
relies heavily on theatrics to galvanise local and possibly national support for its cause but this serves 
a very limited practical political purpose for challenging central government.  
This dissertation has added to the current literature because of the emphasis that is placed on archival 
material. The two investigations into the day-to-day decision-making process of the Council have 
provided detailed accounts of how they fought against the implementation of the Housing Act 1980 
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and local government finance reform, highlighting the limited ability of the Council in mounting 
opposition. Of course this dissertation is not an all-encompassing investigation into the central-local 
government conflict in Sheffield. There is still scope to build on this subject. For example, research 
could be done for an investigation into the collapse of the manufacturing industry in Sheffield and the 
day-to-day role of the Council with its newly-created Employment Department in tackling it. This 
would also be a Council-centric investigation which would be heavily reliant on archival material. 
Furthermore, the issue of local autonomy in Sheffield that is the focus of this dissertation could be 
analysed further. Due to the limitations of this dissertation the question of self-sufficiency has been 
neglected. While this dissertation has argued for the increased role of local autonomy in the central-
local government relationship the issue of how a more autonomous local government is funded at the 
local level needs to be discussed further. This could be another avenue on which to build on this 
dissertation. 
This case study of Sheffield illustrates the divisiveness of British politics in the 1980s. As stated in the 
introduction to this dissertation, Thatcher's agenda divided communities across the country at the time 
of its implementation and its legacy continues to be equally as divisive. It was a time when total 
political opposites collided and fought it out to defeat each the other. This case study has provided 
clear examples of such division. The Labour stronghold that was Sheffield City Council fought it out 
with the Thatcher governments over housing and local government finance reform. They were two 
elected bodies, both on very different ends of the political spectrum, going head to head in a battle of 
political will. The divisions seen at the national level in the Labour Party were also seen in Sheffield. 
The split of the Labour Group in the face of rate capping demonstrated this. Although this split was 
different from the split in the Labour Party nationally, as it was more due to political practicality 
rather than ideological differences, it still showed the divisiveness that was present within the same 
party. Overall the Council tried to defend its position as a bastion of socialim while the Thatcher 
governments were determined to remove any unruly opposition to their agenda. Governments have to 
be forceful if they are to reshape the political landscape. The Thatcher governments were and that is 
why they caused such division both politically and socially in 1980s Britain.   
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